TURKEY'S EUROCLUB APPLICATION AND THE CYPRUS REALITY

October 10, 1997

If Turkey really wants to join the EuroClub, she must be sincere to overcome the problems surrounding her. One of these problems is the long lasting Cyprus conflict and the policies which the successive Turkish governments have adopted in the past. First of all, Turkey should make her position real clear as to whether she wants the conflict to be resolved or not. If so, she must be working towards a solution instead of pretending to be working for a solution.

Otherwise, the everlasting conflict may be 'unilaterally' resolved in the advantage of the Cypriot Greeks as Turkey would further isolate herself from Europe.

One mistake the governments in the southern part of the island and Greece have done is that they have seen Turkey's presence as the 'source' of the problem but not a consequence. By acting such a way they helped prolonging the problem changing its dynamics over the years. With the death of Papandreou and Kostas Simitis' accession to power, the PASOK has been trying to moderate its position, and rechecking the classical Papandreou stand that looks more as a stand against Turkey rather than a case to solve the problem in Cyprus. Such attitude is still present amongst the Greek Cypriots as a result of what Turkey considers the consequence (Turkish Military Operation and Presence).

Ever since the division of the island into two parts, the economy of the southern part has boomed surpassing the Greek economy in per capita income and prosperity. The conflict has been a burden on both Greek and Turkish governments at home (both financially and politically). Greek Cypriots, however, have been able to check the influence of the government in Greece by establishing an immense economic might. Whatever the ideological front it may have, the government in Greece also can not afford to leave their brethren in Cyprus politically. Therefore a reciprocal relationship has developed between the Greek Cypriots and Greece which actually would help solving the problem of Cyprus if a long lasting solution is really wanted. No such relationship has developed between the Turkish government and the self-declared government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). That has shifted the bargaining power from the Turkish Cypriots to the Turks in Ankara who have used this situation for their own domestic political games. In other words, the Turkish Cypriots can not declare independence from the Turkish government whereas the Greek Cypriots can do just that if they deem necessary. The direct involvement of Ankara, therefore, does not derive its power from the international agreements and treaties that were signed since 1960, but from the shift of bargaining power from the Turkish Cypriots to those in Ankara who do not necessarily have a similar mentality, set of values and understanding of being a Cypriot (whether that be Turkish or Greek).

Throw in the 'Turkish National Security' concern as a variable into the equation, and you will find that the direct Turkish involvement does not necessarily serve the interests of the Turkish Cypriots -the very reason that Turkey felt obliged to intervene in 1974- displacing this concern from the top of the priority list of the Turkish case.

As the Greek governments' influence in Cyprus have declined over the years, Ankara's influence has grown letting the politicians use this question for their own political pursuits in Turkey. Since the press in Turkey has relatively become free only recently, a state position on this matter was successfully planted in the mind of the ordinary Turk who now sees the Northern part of the island as a chunk of mainland Turkey with all the Turkish Cypriots, therefore, being Turks. You claim to be Cypriot Turk, you are looked upon with suspicion. The state position has been one of considering the Cyprus problem to be over with the Turkish operation.

Economically dependent on Turkey, Turkish Cypriots were not as much successful as their counterparts across the southern part of the border which allowed Turkish businessmen carry their business and workers (who are willing to work for less wages than Turkish Cypriots). Social and cultural life consequently has been affected.

Such attitude has contributed to the outrage of the Greeks as well as many others in the western world letting them label Turkey as an aggressive force.

It was correct and justified when Turkey unilaterally intervened in Cyprus in 1974. However, intervention based on the events that took place and the international treaties did not give any right to Ankara to manipulate TRNC's economy and politics (and thus the society over all: Many have argued that the demographic face of the island has changed as a result of Turkish political presence). Now, the Turkish Cypriots are divided amongst themselves between those who are growing on an unofficial Turkish state position that would like to 'Turkify' the political, social and economic environment and those who would like to see a unique island culture that would identify with Turkish Cypriot understanding. But the Turkish political culture that loves to centralize power does not allow Turkish Cypriots to be independent.

One justification for that is Ankara's 'national security' concerns. Already tensions high with Greece in the Aegean Sea over national waters (actually there is more to it than national waters, such as potential mineral and oil reserves to be claimed), Turkey wants her security to be consolidated.

Considering all Turkey's neighbors are in the list of countries that sponsor terrorism (except for Greece), Turkey's concerns are understandable. But this national security concern sends a different message to the Europeans.

Especially, with the declaration of Ismail Cem's new regional foreign policy under Mr. Ecevit's supervision that carries the logo ' Not Turkey for Cyprus anymore, but Cyprus for Turkey' written all over the new government's face (actually this line is not made up by me, but they are a literal translation of Mr. Ecevit's words) Turkey makes a statement that she does not have any confidence in a European Union that has a Greek member.

So, if the leaders of the European Commission in Brussels translates that as such they would have every justification to do so with Greeks smiling in the corner.

Ankara is forgetting that it has been knocking on Europe's door for a very long time and such statement is not helping.

On the other hand, Greece is trying to wash her hands of this subject (but can not) so that they can get on with what has become now 'high politics' for them:

National economy and the Greece's prospects in the European Union. It is for that reason that they want to have a politically stable and economically sound Turkey. For the ordinary Turk, however, it is very suspicious that Greece would want something like that. Such attitude is understandable when one considers the lack of democratic values in Turkish political culture. Greece, with Simitis, also acknowledges that Turkey is a regional power and a big market for Europe (which makes Turkey more attractive than Greece in the European Union if only Turkey could overcome its problems at home).

Cyprus, as well, a promising place for Europe with a per capita income of approximate $15000. For their own foreign policy stability, Europe also wants this problem to go away. Consideration of Greek Cypriot application for membership has outraged the Turks in the island as well as in Turkey. Smart Greek Cypriots have also outraged Ankara by ordering S-300 missiles from Russia. It seems, they want more playing cards in their hands for what they want in the island:

Immediate Turkish withdrawal from Cyprus and being able to 'go back their homes'. Such thing will not likely happen anytime soon if it happens at all say the Turks. They may be right, only time will tell.

If Turkey wants to secure a place for them in EuroClub (that is of course after having solved all other problems), she should democratize its political institutions that would help create a more democratic and political thinking. She should abandon potential alternatives with arms justified by a 'national security' concern. In the anarchy of the international order, the international community (and even Greece) understand the security concern. Europe and Greece have given up alternatives with arms long time ago, and they want Turkey to do the same thing. Arrangements can be made for Turkey's security in the Eastern Mediterranean. The price that Turks would have to pay would be only their influence over the TRNC government for gains in their own domestic political arena. With more sound and democratic Turkish political institutions and prospects in Europe, such thing would not be a loss at all compared to indefinite isolation from Europe. One starts thinking and asks the question: Did Turkey not intervene in the name of the peoples of Cyprus (whether that be Turkish or Greek) and the guarantee of their freedom after all?

brende@turkiye.net

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