Briefs

Contents: 1. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ON TURKMENISTAN: WORDS FOR DEAF EARS? 2. AZERBAIJAN'S FORMER PRESIDENT ARRESTED IN MOSCOW 3. TURKEY'S PRIME MINISTER IN BAKU 4. TAJIKISTAN'S GRIM ANNIVERSARY 5. TURCO-ISRAELI ACCORD AGGRAVATES REGIONAL TENSIONS 6. UIGHURS CASUALTY OF "CONFIDENCE BUILDING" IN ASIA 7. A NEW OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IS LAUNCHED IN KAZAKHSTAN 8. CHECHNYA AFTER DUDAEV 9. THE CHINA SUMMITS: OLD GAMES WITH NEW RULES 10. RUSSIAN-KAZAKHSTANI RELATIONS FROM THE CHINESE BORDER TO THE CASPIAN SEA 11. CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM REBORN OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 66, 12 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ON TURKMENISTAN: WORDS FOR DEAF EARS? Lowell A. Bezanis Amnesty International (AI) has recently released a new report on Turkmenistan. Since its last report in November 1993, AI noted a "total absence of improvement in Turkmenistan's record of human rights observance." It described the political climate in Turkmenistan as "secretive, intimidating and repressive." Released in March, 1996, the 22 page report by the renowned London-based human rights organization focused on possible prisoners of conscience, ill treatment and the death penalty. It was based on a visit to Ashgabat in September 1995, a series of interviews with Turkmen officials and political exiles in the United States, Russia and Western Europe, and media reports. The report noted that the leadership of Turkmenistan, headed by President Saparmurad Niyazov [aka Turkmenbasi], makes no secret of its belief that certain individual rights and freedoms are expendable because they threaten the implementation of the President's "10 years of stability" program which allegedly will bring prosperity to the country's population within the first decade of its independence. The heart of the report focuses on persons who may qualify as prisoners of conscience and ill treatment of political opponents. It details the cases of four men serving prison terms for an alleged plot to commit violent anti-state crimes -- which many sources claim never existed. It also discusses the detention of some 20 people for their involvement in a peaceful anti- government protest which occurred last July. The remainder of the report focused on specific cases where there is cause to believe political prisoners have been detained in a psychiatric hospital (in Geok-Tepe), or where the police or government agents were involved in abductions, torture or other forms of physical and psychological abuse. It also briefly focused on, and condemned, judicial use of the death penalty and the wretched conditions in Turkmenistan's prisons. The AI report considers the four men -- Mukhametkuli Aymuradov, Khoshali Garayev, Bayram Vellekov and Yevgenii Sarikov -- to be possible prisoners of conscience and seeks a judicial review of the case against them on the grounds that their connection with the Turkmen opposition may well be their only so- called crime. Likewise, after detailing the unprecedented July 1995 protest against severe economic hardship in Turkmenistan, the report examined the authorities' handling of the affair, including their branding of demonstrators "drug addicts" and "hooligans," and the subsequent imprisonment of 27 persons who were alleged to have organized the protest. Most of those who were imprisoned have been amnestied; AI is seeking information on the charges and fate of the remaining 7, however. The report's conclusion was predictable and well justified. It called on Turkmenistan to respect human rights and those standards to which Ashgabat has already committed itself; and it called on the authorities to stop detaining people for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, opinion and association, and to investigate and prevent torture and to abolish the death penalty. AI's assessment of the nature and extent of human rights abuses in Turkmenistan also applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to all of the Central Asian states and surrounding countries. Unfortunately, these plaintive calls for respect for human rights -- which are at the heart of good government -- are likely to fall on deaf ears, once again. END -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 68, 15 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved AZERBAIJAN'S FORMER PRESIDENT ARRESTED IN MOSCOW by Liz Fuller In what appears to signal a major deal between Moscow and Baku, Azerbaijan's former president Ayaz Mutalibov was arrested on 11 April in Moscow, where he had been living since his ouster by the Azerbaijan Popular Front in May, 1992. Three days later, on 14 April, former Azerbaijani Defense Minister Rahim Gaziev was similarly arrested by Russian and Azerbaijani Interior Ministry officials. The two men will almost certainly be extradited to Baku, where Mutalibov is likely to face trial for his alleged involvement in two minor insurgencies in October, 1994 and March, 1995 by units of the OPON special police. Azerbaijan's current President, Heidar Aliev, has repeatedly argued that the two episodes constituted attempts at a coup d'Ètat with the aim of removing him from power, although there is no evidence to substantiate this version of events. A 57-year-old former technocrat, Mutalibov was elected First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in January, 1990, following the Soviet military intervention in Baku that killed up to 150 people. Despite having injudiciously expressed his support for the perpetrators of the Moscow putsch attempt in August, 1991, Mutalibov was elected president unopposed a few weeks later. In the months that followed, however, he came under increasing pressure from the political opposition. In March 1992, he was held formally responsible for not preventing the slaughter by Armenian forces of several hundred civilians in the Nagorno-Karabakh village of Khodzhali, and was forced to resign. Two months later, he was reinstated as president but he fled the country as a result of pressure from the informal militias aligned with the opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front. He settled in Moscow, whence Azerbaijani media claim he has directed the subversive activities of the so-called "religious-terrorist" organization Gardashlyk ("Brotherhood"). Rahim Gaziev, a mathematician and one of the early leaders of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, voluntarily assumed the leadership of one of the poorly-trained Azerbaijani army units fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh in November, 1991. He was appointed commander of the western front shortly after, and Defense Minister in March, 1992. Although the Azerbaijani armed forces succeeded in winning considerable tracts of territory in northern Karabakh back from the Armenians during the summer and autumn of 1992, Kaziev was fired in February 1993 for attempting to exonerate his subordinate and protÈgÈ Suret Huseinov (who was to launch the coup that toppled President Abulfaz Elchibey four months later) from charges of withdrawing troops from the front-line in direct contravention of orders from Baku. Gaziev was arrested in the autumn of 1993, shortly after Aliev's return to power in Baku, and charged with surrendering the towns of Shusha and Lachin to Karabakh Armenian forces in April-May of that year (when he was no longer defense minister). Together with three associates, Gaziev succeeded in escaping from pretrial detention in late September, 1994, and fled to Moscow. He was tried on charges of state treason and sentenced to death in absentia in February of this year. Since Moscow has for years steadfastly rejected Azerbaijan's requests to extradite Mutalibov (although he was briefly detained by police in May of last year), the most rational explanation for his arrest is that it is part of a deal that entailed some matching concession on the part of the Azerbaijani leadership. Whether this took the form of an agreement on the stationing of Russian military and/or border guards in Azerbaijan -- something which Aliev has hitherto opposed, or an undertaking by Aliev to crack down on illicit arms smuggling to Chechnya, is not yet clear. END -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** --Sender: omripub@mail.omri.cz OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 71, 17 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved TURKEY'S PRIME MINISTER IN BAKU by Lowell Bezanis & Liz Fuller The US scholar Tadeusz Swietochowski once characterized Turkish-Azeri relations as "a long love affair ... with steep ups and downs". The recent two-day visit (14-15 April) to Baku of newly-designated Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz shows the relationship is currently anything but harmonious. Moreover, Baku succeeded in extracting various concessions from Yilmaz, but failed to reciprocate. These current difficulties are the continuation of a pattern that began with the collapse of the USSR in late 1991. Euphoric pronouncements by the late Turgut Ozal about a Turkish sphere of influence from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China created expectations of economic (and, in the case of Azerbaijan, which was engaged in a battle for control of Nagorno-Karabakh) military assistance that the Turkish government was unable, or unwilling, to fulfill. The ensuing disillusion of both sides was compounded by the ouster in June, 1993, of Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish President Abulfaz Elchibey and the return to power in Baku of former Communist Party boss Heidar Aliev, who promptly recommitted Azerbaijan to membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yilmaz's trip to Baku was overshadowed by statements he made last month suggesting Turkey was prepared to open the border gate with Armenia at Alican. This was an apparent effort to cajole Armenia into adopting a more flexible posture in the ongoing OSCE Karabakh peace negotiations and signaled a shift in Turkey's Armenia policy. This proposal infuriated the leadership in Baku. During tete-a-tete talks between Yilmaz and Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev, the latter made it clear that Baku did not welcome any sign that Turkey was softening its posture toward Armenia. Yilmaz, yielding to Azerbaijani pressure, said immediately after this meeting that Turkey would not open the border gate unless Armenia demonstrated its willingness to compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh. He went on to criticize Armenia's failure to make concrete steps at the peace table after Turkey opened an air-corridor to Armenia last year. Aliev's foreign policy advisor Vefa Gulu-zade, for his part was more categorical in expressing Baku's official displeasure, describing Yilmaz an "amateur" on the subject of Karabakh. As at the time of Turkish President Suleyman Demirel's visit to Baku in December 1995, economic problems, specifically Azerbaijan's failure to begin repayment of its $20 million debt to Turkey, which led Turkey's EximBank to freeze further credits, continued to sour relations. No progress was made on resolving this issue, although Aliev commented sarcastically that a country such as Turkey with an external debt of $75 billion should be more accommodating about such a comparatively small sum ($20 million). Yilmaz, after backtracking on Armenia and promising to address the debt problem failed to extract Aliev's unconditional support for Turkey's primary foreign policy objective, namely, the construction of a major oil pipeline to carry Azerbaijan's Caspian oil from Georgia's Black Sea port of Supsa to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Jayhan). A further unsettling development from Turkey's standpoint was the news that the Russian authorities had detained Aliev's arch-rival, ex- President Ayaz Mutalibov, whose extradition Aliev has been demanding for several years. It is widely suspected that Mutalibov's arrest is a reward for major Azerbaijani concessions to Moscow which would further derail Turko-Azerbaijani relations. Given that Turkish-Russian relations remain strained, any concession by Aliev to one of these countries will be regarded with misgiving by the other. Despite such acrimonious undertones, however, the potential economic benefits of regional cooperation are such that Turkey and Azerbaijan have little alternative but to follow the path advocated by Aliev -- to "rise above emotions ... and pursue a realistic policy." In other words, sooner or later, the two will kiss and make up. OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 72, 18 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved TAJIKISTAN'S GRIM ANNIVERSARY by Bruce Pannier Four years ago in Tajikistan crowds were forming in the capital Dushanbe. People who had long been ignored by the government were preparing to make use of their new found right to express their dissatisfaction with policies pursued by their country's leaders. No one could have known at that time that the actions begun would eventually lead the country into one of the most vicious wars fought in recent times. The first on the scene were those Tajiks who wanted changes in the government. These people are the ones the government now refers to as the opposition. Made up of groups with diverse interests, the opposition included The Islamic Renaissance Party, The Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rastakhiz, and La'li Badakhshan (mainly Ismaeli Muslims from Gorno-Badakhshan). The crowd, by some estimates more than 100,000 people, assembled in Shakhidon (Martyr's) Square by the government building and demanded the resignation of the chairman of the Tajik parliament Safarali Kenjaev and other replacements in the presidium. The parliament tried to buy time by agreeing to discuss some of the other demands put forth by the leaders of the demonstration, but refusing to officially expel Kenjaev from the country's leadership. On April 21 the crowd began to take members of the government hostage. Now with their backs against the wall, the parliament accepted the resignation of Kenjaev and gave amnesty to those who had resorted to kidnapping to make their point. Safarali Kenjaev gave notice he was leaving office April 22. With the conclusion of an agreement with the government on April 24, the opposition called on its supporters to return home, satisfied with their accomplishments. The satisfaction was short lived. On the same day, the president of Tajikistan Rahmon Nabiyev signed a decree relieving Anatolii Stroykin as Security Committee Chairman and amazingly naming Kenjaev to the post. The opposition had already considered this possibility and had warned of adverse consequences in the event that Kenjaev would receive the position. If Nabiyev was simply testing the opposition's resolve he did not have to wait long for a reaction. A crowd began to form once more in Shakhidon Square to protest this latest move. Nabiyev should have predicted this, although looking back Nabiyev does seem to have known exactly what he was doing. As the opposition representatives gathered in Shakhidon Square, a different group was forming nearby. Mullah Khaydar Sharifzoda, the Qazi of Kulyab, held a rally in his city and called upon his followers to go to Dushanbe and demonstrate in favor of Kenjaev and the Tajik government. Reports at the time say bus loads of people from the Kulyab area arrived in Dushanbe and gathered at Ozodi (Freedom) Square in front of the parliament building. Politics and religion are volatile topics when discussed by ardent supporters and this stand off had both elements. Nabiyev requested and received from parliament emergency powers on May 1, but there was no real army to back him so he resorted to the Kulyab crowd now joined by sympathizers from Khojent in Tajikistan's north. The inevitable finally happened on May 6 when three people were killed between the two sides. On May 7 fourteen more died. It released the avalanche and violence broke out throughout the city with reports claiming the fighting was still going on up to May 12. On May 7-8 Russian officers and CIS military unit commanders negotiated a deal by which the Tajik opposition gained 8 of the 24 ministries. What could have been the end of the problem turned out to be the beginning of even worse problems. The forces in Kulyab and Khojent refused to recognize the "coalition government." One month after the formation of the "coalition government, forces from the Kulyab area blockaded Kurgan-Tyube, the neighboring area to the west, which supported the coalition government, and began attacking state farms and villages. It signaled the beginning of full scale civil war. Violence spread throughout the country. By year's end the most modest estimates would put the number of dead at 20,000. Others still claim the actual figure is 100,000. A half million people, or one-tenth of the population had lost their homes. More than 100,000 others had fled to war- torn Afghanistan, ironically, now seen as a haven from the fighting in Tajikistan. The crippling effects of the short but ferocious war continue to handicap the country. To date there is still no mutually acceptable political solution to the problems. The war has turned into a guerrilla war and there appears to be no end in sight. END -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 73, 18 APRIL 1996 TURCO-ISRAELI ACCORD AGGRAVATES REGIONAL TENSIONS Lowell A. Bezanis Partial disclosure of the terms of a recently signed Turco-Israeli military cooperation agreement continues to cause an uproar in Middle Eastern capitals. The accord, details of which began to be publicized earlier this month, was signed by Turkey and Israel on 23 February. It provides for joint maneuvers and training exercises as well as the establishment of a security forum for enhancing the strategic dialogue between the two. It is widely suspected the deal also provides for an exchange of intelligence (probably audio monitoring) and emergency use of Turkish air bases. The accord could also serve as the nucleus of a group that Jordan could some day join, and is chiefly aimed at countering security threats from Iran and Syria. Signs have been evident for some time that the two regional military power- houses -- Turkey and Israel -- are heading toward a strategic partnership, supported by the US. The two have traditionally maintained close ties, but Ankara was unwilling to advertise this for fear of alienating pro-Palestinian Arab neighbors. The two countries only exchanged ambassadors in the mid-1980s, and public cooperation developed only after the Middle East peace process gained momentum. Bilateral ties have now been consolidated by a series of developments: the February military accord; Israeli help in upgrading Turkey's aging fleet of Phantom fighters; and the first-ever visit of President Suleyman Demirel to Israel. Media and diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Israel from their Middle Eastern neighbors has, in fact, been escalating since early April. It reached a high pitch with the arrival of a squadron of Israeli F-16 fighters for training maneuvers in Turkish airspace on 15 April --just when the Israeli Defense Forces were bombing Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and killing civilians in the process. Arab countries -- notably Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Libya -- and Iran have condemned the agreement in extremely sharp terms, calling it a threat to their individual and collective security. The Arab League has dubbed the accord "aggression" against Arabs. Iran, with whom Turkey is involved in a major diplomatic dispute, accused Turkey of "stabbing her neighbors in the back." As Middle Easterners are skilled at balance-of-power techniques, the Turco- Israeli accord could encourage fears that a new regional alignment of forces is in the offing. The deal thus inadvertently plays into the hands of those opposed to the "West," to peace with Israel, and to secularism. Such people seek to undermine moderate Middle Eastern regimes, including that of Turkey itself. All of this is likely to be music to the ears of the old Middle East hand, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov. Any hand overplayed by Turkey and Israel, together with the US, could encourage Moscow to attempt to revive its fortunes as a great power by again playing patron to the more radical states in the region. END ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 1996 Open Media Research Institute, Inc. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 75, 22 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved UIGHURS CASUALTY OF "CONFIDENCE BUILDING" IN ASIA By Lowell A. Bezanis The signing of a multilateral treaty on confidence building in Asia by four CIS-member states and China later this week represents a major step towards resolving a key Asian security problem, namely the long-disputed and heavily- armed border between the former Soviet republics and China. The historic deal rests on progress registered to date in determining the disputed border between China and its neighbors, and involves the establishment of a buffer zone between these states. In a concession to China not directly related to the agreement, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (possibly, but not certainly, at Russia's behest) are taking a tougher stance towards Uighur organizations which seek to defend the rights of the 7 million strong Uighur community in China's western-most Uighur Autonomous Province of Xinjiang. The agreement, officially entitled "On Confidence on the Frontier Area," is to be signed in Shanghai during the 24-26 April visit to China of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his counterparts from Tajikistan , Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It provides for the reduction of military forces within a 100 km wide zone running along both sides of the 8000-km long frontier, including the withdrawal of certain types of offensive weapons therein. It also envisages the stationing of only border guards in the frontier zone and lays down special procedures for their movements and exercises. The signing of the confidence-building agreement is a clear sign that the joint CIS and Chinese mapping delegation, which has been working for the past three years to demarcate China's border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has made considerable progress. The demarcation process is, however, still incomplete as progress in different sectors has been uneven. Although the transfer of the relevant territory will take several years, and has been criticized by local Russian officials, Cossack groups and Russian nationalists, at this stage it appears to have the momentum necessary to be completed. This is because the prospective border demarcation can be defended by pointing out that China will transfer almost twice as much territory to Russia as Moscow will be obliged to cede (114,000 square km to Russia, 60,000 square km to China). Moreover, any such deal -- like the confidence building agreement -- will crown Russia's efforts to improve relations with Beijing as part of its strategy to counter the vestiges of what Moscow now terms its overly Western-oriented foreign policy under former Foreign Ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Andrei Kozyrev. It also makes sound economic sense given that China is one of Russia's most important trading partners ($5.4 billion bilateral trade in 1995). A clear casualty of the deal are the Uighurs of western (i.e. former Soviet) Central Asia. These Turkophone Muslims have repeatedly served as political football in Sino-Soviet and now Sino-CIS relations. In the past, both Moscow and Beijing used their respective Uighur (as well as other Turkophone Muslim) minority populations for stirring up trouble in each other's back yard, using broadcasting and publishing as their vehicle for doing so. As in the past, China is today extremely cagey about relations between the over 200,000 strong Uighurs in the CIS (50,000 in Kyrgyzstan and 180,000 in Kazakhstan) and their 7 million brethren in Xinjiang. This is all the more true at this juncture when cross-border trade between western and eastern Central Asia is booming. Although China began to liberalize its harsh nationalities policy in 1978, by 1990 it reversed this course due to growing anxiety over fissiparous tendencies in the USSR, the emergence of outright independent Central Asian states on its Western border and signs of restlessness, if not revolt, among some segments of its own Uighur population. The emergence of pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic tendencies in western Central Asia -- although at present weak and marginal -- has so alarmed Beijing that it has repeatedly called for Almaty and Bishkek to clamp down on Uighur "nationalist and separatist" activism . In a classic maneuver to curry favor in the run up to the signing ceremony in Beijing later this month -- and in a sign of their fear of China -- the authorities in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan signaled their willingness to do precisely this. The first sign came on 4 April when a three-month ban was imposed by the Kyrgyz government on the more radical of Kyrgyzstan's two Uighur organizations, Ittipak [Union]. On 19 April, Kazakhstan's foreign minister gave a clear sign of where Kazakhstan stood on this matter, telling the international press he was "totally opposed" to "certain forces pushing for the right of the people of northwest China to self-determination." The hand played by Bishkek, Almaty and Dushanbe in efforts to demarcate borders with China and "build confidence" in the frontier zone is but an extension of Russian policy on these matters and hence, Central Asian leaders will predictably play but a supportive role in Shanghai later this week. The signing of the agreement demonstrates that respect (or lack of respect) for the rights of ethnic minorities like the Uighurs still serves as a barometer of relations between Moscow and Beijing. A NEW OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IS LAUNCHED IN KAZAKHSTAN by Bhavna Dave An increasing state monitoring of public activity in Kazakhstan since the adoption of new constitution last year has made it ever more difficult for non-government groups to organize themselves and to engage in an open debate on the country's politics. Kazakhstan's stringent laws on regulating activities of public associations and political parties have posed further obstacles to the emergence of such public fora. A clampdown on the activities of the Communist Party, the country's most organized opposition party, appears imminent after the appeal by the Procurator-General to the Ministry of Justice to ban the party for its alleged commitment to the revival of the Soviet Union. In this climate, at its inaugural congress held in Almaty on 20 April, a new nationwide public association called Azamat (Citizen) brought together leading public figures from a wide spectrum. Since last December's parliamentary elections, this is the first major gathering of prominent figures outside the government who are seeking to organize themselves into an independent social force. About 400 people from 12 out of the 19 oblasts of Kazakhstan assembled at the offices of the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan to discuss the movement's charter and to elect its leaders. In a document released to the press, they noted that a deep "social crisis" has gripped the country, which they claim poses a threat to Kazakhstan's statehood and the survival of its citizens. The movement's primary goal, according to the document, is to "form a government of honest and competent people, based on people's trust." The participants elected a coordinating council of 49 members: 20 represent individual oblasts, plus the capital Almaty. The remaining 29 are prominent figures from different professions, mainly writers, scientists, lawyers and artists based in Almaty. The congress elected three co-chairmen: Murat Auezov, a sinologist and Kazakhstan's former ambassador to China; Petr Svoik, the leader of the Socialist Party and the former chairman of the State Committee on Pricing and Anti-Monopoly Measures; and Turegeldy Sharmanov, a member of the Kazakhstani and Russian Academies of Medical Sciences. A broad consensus to launch such a movement was attained in mid-March when an open letter entitled, "We Can No Longer Remain Quiet" appeared in several independent newspapers. (The state-owned newspapers did not publish the text.) About 74 people, mainly intelligentsia, independent political activists, and some members of the government, signed the letter which expressed deep concern over the "near catastrophic social climate" in the country. They argued that the climate was ripe for forming a new alliance of civic forces in the country. In planning its inaugural meeting, the movement's organizers encountered pressure from the authorities. Some 8 out of the original 74 signatories later changed their minds and withdrew their signature, presumably due to fear of invoking official displeasure. Kazakhstan's first cosmonaut Tokhtar Aubakirov, a prominent public figure and advisor to the president, is believed to have refused the offer of co-chairmanship of the movement under official pressure, but remains a major force behind Azamat.. The government refused permission to the movement to hold its meeting at the "Home of Scientists" (dom uchenykh) at the Academy of Sciences. Subsequently the Federation of Trade Unions, which is an "official" body, offered its premises at the behest of the members of the Independent Trade Union. The election of Petr Svoik, chairman of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, as one of the three leaders is perceived as a promising start for an opposition movement. The Socialist Party is a less radical offshoot of the Communist Party, and has advocated strategic cooperation with forces within the government committed to reforms. Svoik accepted President Nursultan Nazarbayev's offer last year to serve as the chairman of the State Committee on Pricing and Anti-Monopoly Policies, but lost his official post last month when he joined forces with Murat Auezov, the major initiator of Azamat.. Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin told Svoik that he was "now free to engage in a full-time criticism of the government," Murat Auezov informed OMRI in an interview. Murat Auezov is a respected public figure who has managed to avoid being coopted into nomenklatura politics. Kazakhstan's intelligentsia and political activists have been urging Auezov to assume a more active public role since the completion of his diplomatic assignment in China in mid 1995 and fill in the void created with the political demise of Olzhas Suleimenov, now Kazakhstan's ambassador to Italy. Nurbulat Masanov, a political scientist and an outspoken critic of the government, said that given his "eminence and charisma," Auezov is the best hope for the opposition. In addition to a favorable background--his father Mukhtar Auezov was one of the most highly- acclaimed Kazakh poets and intellectuals of the early Soviet period--Murat Auezov has a cosmopolitan image that especially appeals to urban Kazakhs, weary of nationalist politics. Efforts to create movements based on "civic accord" and "people's unity" in the past have by and large remained the prerogative of government officials. The prominent pro-government party, People's Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK), which has the largest number of seats in the parliament, is a creation of the nomenklatura. Azamat is a "people's movement, not a movement based on personalities or the intelligentsia," emphasized Auezov. Other leading figures in the movement are Salik Zimanov, a well-known jurist, who played a key role in drafting Kazakhstan's first constitution, Gerold Belger, an ethnic German writer, and Saidakhmet Kuttykadam, an independent political commentator. Azamat is seeking registration with the country's Justice Ministry as a public association, and may not find it too difficult to attain the "official" stamp of approval. Realizing the inefficacy of pursuing an isolated path of criticism, the movement's founders have expressed willingness to cooperate with the president and the parliament. The experience of pro-government parties like PNEK on the one hand, and opposition parties like the Communists and Lad on the other illustrate the difficult maneuvering that embryonic independent political movements have to undertake in order to avoid being either coopted or persecuted by the government. END -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- ** -- OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 81, 24 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved CHECHNYA AFTER DUDAEV by Liz Fuller On 24 April, ending 24 hours confusion, Chechen government representatives finally confirmed the death in a rocket attack during the night of 21-22 April of President Dzhokhar Dudaev. Although Dudaev had become the symbol of the Chechen people's aspiration to independence from Moscow, it would be unwise and premature to assume that his demise will facilitate the convening of peace talks between Moscow and those Chechen political circles intent on defending Chechnya's self- proclaimed independence. On 23 April, at a joint meeting of Dudaev's Cabinet of Ministers and Military Council, vice-president Zelimkhan Yandarbiev was named to succeed Dudaev. Characterized by former Russian Nationalities Minister Valerii Tishkov as "a mediocre writer", the 44 year old Yandarbiev was one of the founders, first of the Vainakh Democratic Party (in May 1990) and then in November, 1990, of the National Congress of the Chechen People -- the movement that brought Dudaev to power. Yandarbiev was appointed vice-president by Dudaev in April 1993 and was responsible for "ideological issues" -- he is reputed to be one of the hard-line adherents of total independence for Chechnya. Yandarbiev's nomination was reportedly not wholeheartedly endorsed by some other influential members of Dudaev's leadership, specifically military commander Shamil Basaev. The reaction of Dudaev's chief of staff, Aslan Maskhadov, is not known. (Maskhadov, who in contrast to Yandarbiev has the reputation of a pragmatist and a realist, and who has not been as categorical as Dudaev in stipulating the conditions under which he would consider a peace settlement, is reportedly currently in the town of Shali which is under siege by Russian troops.) A further complicating factor is that Dudaev's death coincides with reports of growing rifts within the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership. Not only has one deputy premier, Beslan Gantemirov, split with pro-Moscow head of state Doku Zavgaev and announced his intention of forming a shadow cabinet; a second deputy premier, Abdulla Bugaev, is at odds with Zavgaev over demilitarization. (Bugaev proposes reviving the Special Observer Commission created last summer to monitor implementation of the demilitarization agreement; Zavgaev considers this inexpedient.) The biggest wild card of all, however, is former Russian parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. An ethnic Chechen who in the autumn of 1994 tried to coordinate the actions of the anti-Dudaev Provisional Council headed by Umar Avturkhanov, Khasbulatov has since switched allegiance and is now, together with one of Dudaev's advisors and Aslan Maskhadov's deputy commander in chief, one of three co-chairmen of a Coordinating Council of Chechen political parties that is scheduled to convene on 27 April. OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 85, 26 APRIL 1996 Copyright (c) 1996, Open Media Research Institute All Rights Reserved THE CHINA SUMMITS: OLD GAMES WITH NEW RULES by Roger Kangas Russian President Boris Yeltsin's three-day trip to Beijing and Shanghai, which ended on 26 April, netted the leader two sets of agreements to bring back to the voters. The first was a series of bilateral accords between Russia and China, aimed at forging a strong partnership into the next century. The second was a "confidence-building" treaty that also included the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Both sessions were full of pomp, ceremony, and questions about the ultimate beneficiaries of the final products. The 25 April bilateral agreements signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin were long on expectations and mutual admiration. In them, the two sides outline their desire to create a strategic partnership, which will include a mechanism for information exchanges, military cooperation, nuclear cooperation, and border stability. Of particular interest was the settling of on-going border disputes, and the recognition that 19 kilometers of 5,500 kilometer border is still in question. In addition, the two sides called for greater trade and even the establishment of free trade zones which will boost the bilateral trade figures from $5.48 billion in 1995 to an incredibly high target of $20 billion in 1996. Yeltsin also relayed the message that China is now willing to consider signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as early as the end of September. The Clinton administration welcomed the news, saying it was "very encouraged" by the progress Yeltsin made in prompting this decision. Jiang called the visit a success and referred to the two countries as ones who "strive to be good friends, good partners and good neighbors for each other." Following the Beijing meeting between the Russian and Chinese presidents, the two traveled to the city of Shanghai where they met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan for a 26 April signing of the agreement "On Confidence on the Frontier Area." In statements made before the meeting, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Askar Akayev, and Imomali Rakhmonov, the respective presidents of the three Central Asian states, spoke of the need to cooperate with the two larger nations. The agreement signed calls for the reduction of military units within a 100 kilometer zone on either side of the 8,000 kilometer border which China shares with the four CIS states. It also states that the signatory nations will neither attack nor direct military exercises against one another. As the various leaders return home from China, they will most likely call these documents historic and significant. For Yeltsin, they can be evidence of his foreign policy initiatives and statesmanship -- qualities to promote in an election year. For both Russia and China, this was also an opportunity to snap at the United States. As Yeltsin was in Beijing, Chinese newspapers called the accords a "major achievement in China's peace diplomacy" and "a heavy blow at the hegemonist forces which attempt to 'contain' China." The American response to any perceived "collaboration" has been mild at best, with officials reiterating the point that the U.S. doesn't "have any concerns." Experts note that a Russo-Chinese alliance lacks the punch that it might have had during the height of the Cold War, pointing out that Chinese exports to the U.S. topped $40 billion in 1995 -- making it a much more significant economic force in the Chinese economic market than the Russians even hope to be. It has also been stressed that the military hardware that could be part of any cooperative agreement is technologically antiquated by U.S. standards. Indeed, the reaction tends to be one of acceptance of any Russo-Chinese cooperation, especially if it means that China will sign the CTBT. The game of "playing the China card," it seems, isn't as effective as it once was. Perhaps more interesting is a shadow-version of the "Great Game." The Shanghai accords are technically among equal partners and are part of an effort to establish secure borders in the region, even if the actual reduction of bases and personnel is minimal. They are also indicative of China's interest in Central Asia as a potential market and source of energy in the coming decades. If China's economy is to continue its rapid growth, it will need the energy and raw material sources that countries like Kazakhstan can eventually supply. Likewise, if the Central Asian states are looking for a geographically-close alternative to Russia, China may be that partner. While this does not mean that a Kipling-esque game is in progress, it underscores the increasing importance of China to the region. The fact that the Central Asian leaders are eager to cooperate with Beijing, even to the point of remaining mute on the problems of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang, indicates a potential shift in foreign policy focuses. Ultimately, it will be difficult to judge if these agreements will amount to anything more than political posturing or confirming the current reality in the "east." While these might be reminiscent of old games, the rules are definitely new. RUSSIAN-KAZAKHSTANI RELATIONS FROM THE CHINESE BORDER TO THE CASPIAN SEA by Roger Kangas Last week's China summits will be noted for the advances made in Russo- Chinese relations, and the "confidence-building" agreement signed by Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. For Central Asia, the latter accord, signed in Shanghai on 26 April, can also be seen as further evidence of China's increasing presence and importance in the region. Editorials in the western media stressed this point, noting that China is the neighbor to watch in the coming years, not Russia. For Kazakhstan, the future is less predictable, especially in light of the recent bilateral accords signed in Almaty on 27 April between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Both left Shanghai that day for Almaty, with Nazarbayev arriving early enough to be able to greet his Russian counterpart, who arrived at 3:00 pm. For the next four hours, the two leaders met in private conference, which resulted in a series of five agreements signed. First among the agreements was a protocol reorganizing the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which oversees a $1.2 billion cooperative effort on the part of Russia, Kazakhstan, Oman, and a number of international oil companies. In an effort to break a three-year deadlock among the participant states, the new power-sharing agreement will give Russia 24% ownership, Kazakhstan 19%, Oman 7%, with the remaining 50% divided among the oil firms (LUKOil 12.5%, Rosneft of Russia 7.5%, Chevron Corporation 15%, Mobil Corporation 7.5%, British Gas PLC and Agip 2% each, and Oryx Energy Company and Kazakhstan's Munaigaz 1.75% each). This effectively gives Russia 44% control over Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea oil. In addition, the two leaders signed an agreement with Oman's oil minister to build a 1440 kilometer pipeline from Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil fields to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. In addition, agreements were signed on setting up two Russian-Kazakh joint ventures: the first is a financial-industrial group Elektromedpribor, and the second is to produce diesel engines. Two other accords involved pension guarantees for residents of Baikonur (formerly Leninsk) and a Kazakh commission for the Baikonur complex. The status of Baikonur has been a sticking point in the past several years, which the last agreement addresses. The economic accords are also seen as part of a larger network of ventures that the leaders hope to foster within the framework of the 29 March Moscow treaty between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus. At a joint news conference shortly before Yeltsin's departure for Moscow, the leaders each stressed their respect for the other country's sovereignty. Yeltsin noted that, "Kazakhstan and Ukraine are indivisible as is Russia....We do not claim even an inch of other countries' lands, but nor will we give up ours." He also gave fair warning of possible "carving up of territory" if the Communists won the June presidential race. Both leaders "hailed the dynamic and progressive development of Russian-Kazakh relations" and the "commitment to constructively contribute to the strengthening of integration among the CIS member states." Equally important is the fact that real progress might now be underway in the financially-lucrative CPC, especially as the major political participants have all signed on board. The hope is that this weekend's activities will placate Kazakhstan's border concerns with China in the east and facilitate the development of the oil reserves in the west. The Almaty meeting also highlighted the continued importance of Russia in Kazakh foreign policy. This does not mean that all major bilateral issues have been resolved, as both sides only agreed to set up a convention in the future to define the status of the Caspian and the specific ownership of its resources. In addition, the two touched on, but did not resolve, in the words of Yeltsin, "the position of our (Russia's) fellow countrymen in Kazakhstan." Rhetoric aside, this is not the first time that Yeltsin and Nazarbayev have considered described their respective leadership as essential to stability and democracy in their countries. However, perhaps symbolic of the two leaders' effort to foster bilateral ties was the event which started the visit. Immediately after Yeltsin arrived in Almaty, he and Nazarbayev laid a wreath at the Glory memorial which commemorates the Kazakh soldiers who died in the Second World War. It seems that once again, the leaders are calling for cooperation in the face of adversity. OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF No. 91, 30 APRIL 1996 CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM REBORN by Lowell Bezanis and Liz Fuller In a move that appears to resolve years of wrangling, and which will remove existing obstacles to the export of oil from Kazakhstan's vast Tengiz field, on 27 April officials from Russia, Oman and Kazakhstan, together with representatives of eight oil companies, signed an agreement in Almaty on construction of a 1,500 km pipeline to transport oil from western Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. The deal gives new life to the four-year old Caspian Pipeline Consortium by expanding its membership to include Western companies that will supply the necessary financing. It also constitutes a significant victory for Russia, which is now the major shareholder with a total of 44%, and suggests that Kazakhstan is moving closer towards complying with Russia's insistence that any decisions on exploiting Caspian resources must be made jointly by all littoral states. The pipeline will link up with the existing pipeline from Baku via Grozny to Tikhoretsk, whence it will be extended to Novorossiisk. The first oil is scheduled to flow in 1998. The estimated output of the Tengiz field in western Kazakhstan-- one of the world's largest -- is 700,000 barrels per day (bpd). Tengiz is jointly owned by the US oil giant Chevron, the Russian Lukoil, and the government of Kazakhstan. Export of Tengiz oil has hitherto been limited to an artificially low 60,000 bpd because of a combination of adverse factors including Russian intransigence and financial problems. The initial agreement to construct an export pipeline to deliver Kazakhstan's oil to western markets was signed by Kazakhstan and Oman in June, 1992. At that juncture, it was intended that the pipeline should link up with the north-south pipeline from Grozny to Baku, given that the Azerbaijani leadership was counting on construction of a pipeline that would extend the existing one from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea port of Batumi, and from there across Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik. Azerbaijan duly became the third member of the consortium in July, 1992, but opted out because of its inability to raise the requisite financing. Russia, which has consistently sought to control the export of oil from both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as part of its overall efforts to retain economic and political leverage over them, entered the consortium in July 1993, and succeeded in persuading its partners to abandon the immensely expensive Baku-Batumi-Yumurtalik project in favor of the present route. After construction of the pipeline had already begun the project ran into problems. Oman demanded a substantial share of the profits, which Chevron refused. Russia for its part imposed increasingly stringent conditions for allowing Chevron to use the pipeline, delaying still further a final agreement on the financing of the pipeline. Oman had originally undertaken to raise the requisite funding for the pipeline by October, 1995, but failed to do so. The outlines of the present arrangement became clear immediately thereafter, when it was decided to break the financing logjam holding up the project by reducing the shares of Kazakhstan, Oman, and Russia and inviting the participation of international oil companies. Under the new agreement, Western concerns, including Chevron, Mobil, British Gas, and the Italian Agip, will finance the entire project, while all necessary guarantees will be provided by the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan. This arrangement benefits Russia, which is, as President Boris Yeltsin said, "satisfied" with the deal. It likewise pleases Kazakhstan, which is desperate for the hard currency to be earned from exporting its oil wealth, and reassures Chevron, which to date has invested $700 million in Tengiz. The major loser is Oman, whose share in the CPC has been reduced to 7%.