Xinjiang and ex-Soviet Central Asia:

Impressions of Chinese Turkestan


Economic growth continues at a rapid pace. During the
period 1985-1991, the Xinjian-Uigur Autonomous Region had the
highest rate of real income growth in China. The continuing
economic boom is visible in large amounts of new construction
in cities and continued expansion of infrastructure. Though
the region as a whole is not as highly developed economically
as ex-Soviet Central Asia, present economic conditions are
clearly better. Xinjiang is already attracting significant
foreign investment. Highways, energy installations, water
systems, communications, and urban facilities are being stea-
dily improved.
Improvements are taking place not only in Urumchi and Kashgar,
but in many smaller cities, such as Yarkand, Khotan, and
Turfan, and traders and craftsmen in small towns are active
too.
The highway from Kyrgyzstan over the Torugart Pass to Artush
and Kashgar (over which I travelled in September 1994) is in
relatively good concition on the Kyrgyz side, but is in deplo-
rable condition on the Chinese side of the border. Neverthe-
less, it carries a large amount of heavy truck traffic. The
Chinese are rebuilding it to very high standards, but will
require two or three years to complete.
Food supply is good. Agricultural land is intensively cultiva-
ted. There are many signs of increasing rural prosperity:
farmers are building additions to their houses and adding
other buildings to their compounds. Most of them engage in
diversified production: fruits and vegetables, grain (mainly
rice and maize), cotton, animals and poultry, and sikworms.
While most rural transport is still based on horses and don-
keys, more and more small tractors are in use. In contrast to
the ex-Soviet Union, Chinese tractors and other farm machinery
are well suited for small-scale, private agriculture. All
agricultural communes have been dissolved. Farmers must deli-
ver quantities of certain priority products (e.g., silk co-
coons, cotton) to state purchasing agencies at relatively low
prices; they are free to sell the rest of their production on
the open market, so they have incentive to produce more and
more. Chinese- manufactured consumer goods of all kinds are
available in large quantities, but many of the population's
needs are still satisfied by small craftsmen who work and sell
without restrictions. Population-limitation programs seem to
be having very little impact in rural areas. Houses in villa-
ges frequently have red plaques above their doors on which the
family is given a gold star on a number of qualities: cleanli-
ness, productivity, community, participation, family planning,
etc. I do not recall seeing any who had a star for family
planning.

TRADE WITH EX-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Beijing policy emphasizes continued economic expansion in
Xinjiang and further development of trade with South Asia
(especially Pakistan) and the newly independent ex-Soviet
countries. Chinese firms have been eager to import raw materi-
als from the countries of the ex-Soviet Union because prices
have been very favorable. There is no doubt that some of this
trade in poducts such as iron and steel, e.g. consists of
opportunistic re-export of commodities from russia and offers
little prospect of long-term continuation. On the other hand,
there is likely to be a steady market in China for hides and
skins, cotton, wool, and minerals that are produced in Central
Asia. Opportunities for export of electricity from Central
Asia to china may expand. Much cross-border trade takes place
on a small scale but cumulatively the value of this trade is
sybstantial. Much of it is not reflected in Chinese or Central
Asian countries statistics.
For the present, independent Central Asian governments
will be well advised not to attempt to limit or control this
trade too closely, for restrictions on trade and complex
border procedures are likely to encourage smuggling and cor-
ruption among customs officials. Ralatively unimpeded croo-
border trade is to the net advantage of all.

POLITICS
There is no open political life in Chinese Turkestan in
the sense in which it has been developing in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan and the press and electonic media remain under firm
government control. There is greatly increased publishing of
books and educational materials in local languages, however,
and careful attention to use of Uygur (always in Arabic
script) on an epual basis with Mandarin for all public purpo-
ses. A calculated effort by the Beijing government to preempt
ethnic nationalism by making the non-Chinese partners in
government and society is more evident than ever. More Uygurs
now occupy senior governmental positions and are prominent in
both commercial and public life. Uygurs also appear to be a
majority among police and lower level officials. The aim is
obviously to make the non-Chinese feel they havea vested
interest in maintaining the present system and giving them an
opportunity to projit from it. (I did not visit Kazakh-popula-
ted areas, so Icannot comment on whether this approach is also
being followed there, but there is no reason to believe it is
not.)
For the present, the approach seems to be working rather
well, for I heard of no recent outbreaks of dissidence or
rebellion. Disturbances which occurred during the past few
years were quickly (and often brutally) suppressed. Potential-
ly dissident groups among the non-Han population seem to have
learned that open expression of dissatisfaction brings dispro-
portionately negative results at this stage in China's politi-
cal evolution.
All this notwithstanding, in all essentials, the Xinji-
ang-Uygur "Autonomous" Region is still ruled from Beijing.
Whether, in the long run, Beijing's current policies will
dampen desires for real autonomy and/or independence remains
an open question.
Though officially still the "state religion,"communism as
a political creed seems moribund, as it does throughout China.
A huge statue of Mao still stands in Kashgar, but is looked
upon with amusement by the local population. Formal politics
is confined to slaganry which is seldom taken seriously.
Officials justify their role by their ability to maintain
economic expansion and improve the life of the population.
Khotan, when Ivisited, was celebrating the tenth anniversary
of its elevation to the status of an independent municipality.
The great upsurge in the economy of the city that has occured
in the past decade was the dominant theme.

RELIGION
Religion is flourishing openly. The number of operating
mosques is astonishing and more are under contruction. Kashgar
is said to have over 250 and even in Urumchi, where Muslims
are a minority, there are several large mosques in the center
of the city. Religious books of all kinds are sold openly adn
religious instruction is available to young people. Many
religious and historical monuments destroyed or damaged during
the Cultural Revolution have been restored and others are
under reconstruction. The impressively rebuilt tombs of impor-
tant cultural and historical figures such as Sadik Bugra Khan
near Artush and Mahmud al-Kashgari at Opal attract large
family groups and busloads of local visitors. There is no
antireligious propaganda at them. The many religious and
historical monuments of Yarkand are being restored in impres-
sive fashion.
I saw and heard of almost no evidence of religious fana-
ticism, however. The population, almost entirely Sunni,does
not seem susceptible to Iranian or Wahhabi appeals. The number
of veiled women seen on the streets of cities (never large)
seems to have decreased during the six years I have been
visiting this region. Very few are seen in the countyside.
While many men and women, especially in the countryside, still
wear traditional dress, young people almost all wear modern
clothes, though they often display the characteristic Central
Asian love of color.

THE MILITARY

China continues to maintain major military forces in the
region but they are kept so much in the background that tra-
vellers rarely see soldiers, except when they cross the land
borders.Military installations are in inconspicuous locati-
ons. Few soldiers are visible on the streets of cities or in
the countryside. Ther is little glrification of the military
in public signs and propaganda. Troops are nevertheless de-
ployed so that they can be swiftly called upon in case of
disturbances, as they have been in recent years.
Since nono of China's neighbours in this region represent
a serious threat or even maintain significant military forces
along China's borders, the mission of the Chinese military in
Xinjiang is obviously internal. No one talks about this, bu it
is obvious to all, local nationalities and Chinese alike.

HISTORY

The Chinese inadvertently reveal their sensitivity about their
colonial possession of the region in recitations and interpre-
tations of history. Over and over again one hears from offici-
als and guides that Xinjiang belonged to China from very early
times. Explanations of ancient history often include referen-
ces to Chinese links with West Turkestan, too. At historical
sites and in museums, Chinese connections are stressed and
Turkic and other aspects of Central Asian history are someti-
mes ignored. Spectacular ancient cities, such as Kocho/Karak-
hoja and Yarkhoto, are identified primarily by their Chinese
names (Gao-chang and Jiao-he, respectively) and their primary
significance as capitals and trading centers of major Turkic
states and empires is down-played. I saw some evidence that
this emphasis on Chinese connections may be counterproductive-
-i.e., annoying to Uygurs and other non-Chinese ethnic troups,
since they are increasingly aware of the process of opening up
and rediscovering their history that is goint on among the
peoples of ex-Soviet Central Asia. Resentment, if it is wides-
pread, is nevertheless private and almost entirely under the
surface.

CHINESE POLICY

One does not get the impression in Chinese Turkestan of
heavy handed Beijing rult or of jittery sensitivity on the
part of the authorities about ethnicity or religion. For the
time being, Chinese officialdom gives the impression of confi-
dence that their desires for the region are working out accor-
ding to plan. There is considerable talk of the great economic
upsurge expected with development of the oil resources of the
Tarim Basin. At the same time, there is local concern that
profits from oil and other mineral development will accrue
mostly to Beijing--and in this connection, too, the local
population is increasingly alert to developments in the newly
independent Central Asian states across the Tian-Shan where,
after long years of colonial exploitation by Moscow, indepen-
dent governments are taking control of natural resources.
For the time being, however, Beijing and its officials in
Xinjiang apppear to be hoping that by permitting maximum
medium-and lower-level economic oportunit and religious free-
dom the population can be kept content. Nevertheless, manife-
stations of dissidence or outbreaks of rebellion, should they
occur, will no doubt continue to be dealt with qouckly and
harshly. All evedence is that Beijing will avoid risking
development of pressure for greater intellectual and political
freedom by dramatizing iven the mild and seemingly benign
steps that have been taken toward poltical liberalization.
Such political liberalization as exists is entirely the by-
product of relaxation previous economic and social restricti-
ons.

CROSS-BORDER INFLUENCES

The entire population of Chinese Turkestan is well aware
of what they regard as basically favorable developments over
the mountains to the west, though there is also realization
that the transition from communism has caused pain and strain.
There is no longing for restoration of the Soviet Union or an
increase of Russian influence in the Central Asian States.
Cross-border contact is most intense between Uigurs and Dun-
gans who. through extended-family links, can acquire capital
and arrange other forms of support for commercial operations
in both directions. Han Chinese are equally interested in
exploiting openings for trade and work in the ex-Soviet coun-
tries. Overtly, all these relationships have primarily econo-
mic and social purposes.
While uygurs (and other non-Chinese nationalities) in
Xinjiang are watching political developments en the ex-Soviet
countries with deep but quiet interest, some of theri co-
ethnics in these countries are encouraging greater political
assertiveness among their compatriots-- often relatives--in
China. This worris Beijing and, if such activity increases,
may lead to pressure on the independent Central Asian coun-
tries to discourage the activities of their own Uygur and
Dungan citizens. Some unpublicized protests have already been
made to Central Asian governments.
Except for regret at the confusion that has characterized
Tajikistan and the current Russian presence there, the native
population in Xinjiang is not apprehensive about the govern-
ments and policies of the now independent Central Asian sta-
tes. There is no anticipation of major problems or tension.
With steadily increasing cross-border traffic in both goods
and people, much more frequent contact between Central Asian
officials and those in Xinjiang has developed-- and will, of
necessity, continue to expand. Most of this contact revolves
around administrative and technical issues, but it is bound to
have political overtones. Beijing has not--and probably could
not--attempt to dominate or exercise tight control over these
regional-level relationships.
Because of language and cultural affinities, they are natural-
ly more efficient when the officials on both sides are Turkic
Muslims, as they usually are.

CHINA'S FUTURE--IMPLICATIONS FOR XINJIANG

Will China go the way of the Soviet Union? One does not ask
this question openly in East Turkestan. It is nevertheless in
hte back of the mind of almost everyone who lives there,
officials as well as all the rest. Several years ago the
London The Economist called both the Soviet Union and China
outdated empires destined to undergo drastic transformation or
collapse. The communist leadership in Beijing rejects this
diagnosis for China. Many serious students and observers of
China do not. China's leaders feel Gorbachev foolishly des-
troyed the Soviet Union by experimenting with political reform
while neglecting economic transformation. The Chinese approach
has been exactly the opposite. So far it has worked.
But for how long? China's economic success--its extraor-
dinary pace of economic growth--could perhaps lead--albeit
along a different path--to the same result as the collapse of
the Soviet Union. In spite of extreme political and economic
centralization the Soviet Union broke up into its ethnic
components. Ethnicity alone may not pose as great a danger for
China, though nationalism appears to be growing aming the
Mongols, the Uigurs and, in particular, the Tibetans. Economic
disparities could be a more important factor than ethnicity,
however.
China's economically most successful regions are less and less
inclined to let Beijing dictate their course of development or
draw off the profits from their success. In Xinjiang, the two
factors come together--local nationalism and the desire to
gain direct benefit from the region's resources.
It is impossible to foresee how the leaders who will
succeed the old men still dominant in Beijing will try to cope
with China's problems. If they attempt to maintain the increa-
singly illusory and anachronistic supremacy of the communist
party, they may cause their empire to collapse as the Soviet
empire did, leaving its component parts to take charge of
their own future as independent successor states. If they
pursue a more moderate course but still try to reverse econo-
mic liberalization, reimpose centralization, or resort to
oppression to stem gradually increasing pressures for broader
participation in political decision-making, they could push
important regions in de facto separatism, a process which to a
very limited degree is already occurring.
The geographic isolation from which Chinese Turkestan
long suffered was prartially broken when the Karakorma
Highway linking it to Pakistan was opened in the early 1980s.
Trade (and tourism)over this route has steadily increased and
plans are now being made to upgrade it to an allweather highw-
ay. Direct air traffic between Xinjiang and neighboring regi-
ons has been growing in frequency and importance. The collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 has already had a profound
effect on Chinese Turkestan, for with it came the opening of
the old Sino-Soviet border which had been tightly closed
during most of the 20th century. The inherent historical
unity of all of Turkestan--indeed, all of Inner Asia, is now
being reestablished. The impact of this change will increase
steadily during the years ahead. So far these develoments do
not go against current Beijing policies. Beijing continues to
encourage expansion of Xinjiang's ties to the outer world and
is more eager than ever for foreign investment. More and more
blocks of the Traim Basin are now being opened to prospecting
by foreign oil companies. Chinese officials estimate oil
reserves there at 20 to 40 billion tons. Some Western oilman
talk of potential reserves as great as those of Saudi Arabia.
Enormous investment will be required not only to tap the
oilfields of the Tarim Basin, but also to refine and/or trans-
port it to market. It is obvious that successful exploitation
of it will have a profound impact on most aspects of life in
Xinjinang, including politics. It coud also lead to a dramatic
realignment of energy supply and other trade relationships
throughout Inner Asia with important implications for the
policics of the entire region as well.