Part 3 of 4

Sultangalievism

If a revolution succeeds in England, the proleteriat
will continue oppressing the colonies and pursuing
the policy of the existing bourgeois government; for it
is interested in the exploitation of these colonies. In
order to prevent the oppression of the toiler of the
East we must unite the Muslim masses in a communist
movement that will be our own and autonomous.112

Sultangaliev used the English example as a thin
cloak for his true thoughts against the ideology and
practise of the RCP(b)113. One had only to substitute the
word "Russian," to understand the meaning of the
statement. Having served as the deputy Commissar of
Nationalities, as Stalin's assistant, Sultangaliev was
well aware of Bolshevik methods and means of control. He,
like many other non-Russians in the RCP(b), had seen the
direction of the Bolshevik revolution: Russian
domination. The only path to salvation was to form a
separate party and political union to fight for
independence.
Sultangaliev was briefly arrested in 1923 and Stalin
denounced his former deputy:
....I accused [Sultangaliev] of creating an
organization of the Validov114 type... nevertheless,
a week later, he sent... a secret letter... to
establish contact with the Basmachi and their leader
Validov...115

Sultangaliev was purged and disappeared in 1928,
along with other adherents of the movement. But even the
existence of the idea presented by Sultangaliev was
causing nightmares for Stalin. Frequent exhortations
againt Sultangalievism among nationalities, especially
Central Asians were made:

The ideological and organizational destruction of
Sultangalievism does not yet mean that our offensive
against nationalism must come to an end. The Tatar
Obkom invites all members of the Communist party to
hunt down Sultangalievists, to reinforce the
struggle against all kinds of national manifestations
among backward masses, and to unmask the still numerous
bearers of Sultangalievism in our party and Soviet
apparatus.116

Of course, the bogey-man Pan-Turkism and
Pan-Islamism were once more put on display, this time
even in more contradictory terms such as "Pan-Turkic
Nationalism." Under the guise of slogans such as
"internationalism," "brotherhood of nationalities,"
"coming closer," and "merging of nationalities," the
policies beneficial to the Russians were pursued by the
Soviet leadership in Moscow. The purges decimated the
ranks of the educated Central Asians. A Russian dominated
bureaucracy attempted to destroy Central Asian history,
subvert their indigenous literature, exploit the Central
Asian natural resources. While doing so, the regime
destroyed the pristine environment. Not all of these
crimes are yet known in the West, but more are gaining
attention.

Central Asian issues under Gorbachev117

Only recently have the results of decades of
political, economic, social, cultural, environmental
abuse been aired. The Bolsheviks castigated tsarist
use of Turkistan as a colony, but followed in their
predecessors footsteps extracting cotton and raw
materials for Soviet industry despite cost to the local
population or environment. The cotton, irrigation,
fertilizer "triad" has caused monstrous ecological and
human health damage. Due to the overuse of chemical
fertilizers and growth stimulants, infant mortality has
jumped. Mothers were warned not to nurse their babies
because their own milk is polluted. Shortened life
expectancy plagues all Central Asian republics.
In 1987 almost one-third of all fish in the Volga
basin died from pesticide poisoning. In many regions,
pesticides are now turning-up in the water supply.
According to Goskompriroda [State commissariat for the
environment] more than 10,000 hectares of land contain
concentrations of DDT above sanitary norms, some two to
eight times the established norm. In one case, students
were sent to the field to gather the onion crop. They
were poisoned from handling the onions. It was discovered
that the crop and the soil contained 120 times the norm
prescribed for pesticides. The farm's director maintained
that the students were suffering from exhaustion
--apparently at the behest of local party officials
worried about "alarming" the public.
Komsomolskaya Pravda reported in April 1990 that 43
persons,including 37 children, were hospitalized in
Uzbekistan after eating a meal of mushrooms which turned
out to be toxic. Two of the children died. The mushrooms
were of an edible variety, but they were contaminated
with "...toxic chemicals, pesticides, and other muck"
which had leached into the soil after heavy rains stated
the paper.
Perhaps the most dramatic result has been the
destruction ofthe Aral Sea, well known thanks to mass
media coverage. Several US universities have either
conducted conferences on the subject,or are planning to
do so.118 The waters of the Aral Sea have been used to
irrigate cotton, the reason for its disappearance. This
has profound effects. In addition to the destruction of
the sea's fish (and fishing industry), salt driven by
winds from the dry sea bed has destroyed vegetation as
far away as Chimkent [Green City], 450 miles to the east.
Plague, claimed Radio Moscow in May, threatens the region.
A television marathon in Kazakhstan (which bordered the
sea on the north) raised almost 40 million rubles for a
fund to help the people whose health and livelihoods have
been destroyed by the drying up of the Aral Sea.
Kazakistan has other environmental damage as well.
In 1990, a Danish television documentary stated that
inhabitants of a village in Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk
Oblast were used as guinea-pigs during an atmospheric
nuclear test in 1953. The documentary, summarized by the
French News Service (AFP), included an interview with a
Kazakh man who had been one of the 40 guinea- pigs made
to stay behind when other villagers were evacuated before
the test. According to the report, all 40 contracted
cancer, and 34 have already died from the disease. This
report would not be news to the inhabitants of
Semipalatinsk --the effects of the August 1953 test have
been frequently described in great detail in the Kazakh
press.
Even after the testing has stopped, the effects will
linger. A recent news report indicated that out of the
total population of Kazakhstan, seven million now suffer
from some form of cancer. During 1990 a private
philanthropic fund was established to provide medical
assistance to children affected by nuclear testing in
Semipalatinsk. The people who suffer from the ills of
this state-caused disaster are spending their own money
to find a cure.
Economic policies inflicting less overt damage
involve trade between Moscow and the individual republics.
In the case of Kazakhstan, the Kazak trade deficit is
over one billion "trade rubles." This, despite the large
exports of varying commodities from Kazakhstan to the
Russian republic. The primary reason is that Moscow sets
the prices and the republics have to sell their produce
at artificially low prices, well below those of the
world market. On the other hand, they must pay much more
for their imports from Moscow usually at market prices.
The republics never had control over the transactions;
Gosplan (the Central State Planning Office) decided who
manufactured what, where and when, including investment
for construction of facilities. The same maybe said of
every Central Asian republic.
The economic issues are linked to fundamental
matters of national identity and culture. Following again
the tsarist precedent, the Soviet regime retained sharply
divided education (technical education is in Russian),
linguistic and attempted social and biological
russification campaigns, low investment in Central Asia,
and settlement of Russian workers as the "price" of new
factory construction. The terminology has been changed,
but the substance has not.119 Among the legacies of
Moscow's rule was the death and destruction of forced
collectivization, and against this protest has been
pronounced.
A group of writers who made up an advisory council
to the Kazakh literary weekly Qazaq Edebiyeti have called
for the erection of a monument to the Kazakhs who died in
the collectivization campaign in the 1930s. According to
their appeal, published on the front page of Qazaq
Edebiyeti April 13, 2.5 million Kazakhs perished under
Stalin. The writers would like the memorial to be
completed by 1992, the sixtieth anniversary of the
collectivization-caused famine.

Anarchy in Central Asia?120

Central Asians' long standing demands can be
summed-up in two broad categories: 1) the end of
centrally ordered quotas, ranging from
out-of-region-origin cadre appointments to colonial-
style forced cotton production, and settlement of
non-native populations; 2) an end to environmental
pollution from nuclear tests to pesticide poisoning.
Central Asians, like other non- Russians, have been
interested in economic justice and greater autonomy in
their internal affairs. But accurate information on
Central Asia not readily available to Western journalists
or policymakers. Moscow has been able to use that
ignorance to play on various Western fears and
prejudices, raising the specter of political chaos,
nuclear proliferation and, the successor to the
Pan-Islamic threat, Islamic Fundamentalism.
First, the "Treaty Principle of the Soviet
Federation," raised by Gorbachev at the 28th Party
Congress, was not abandoned after the coup attempt of
August 1991. Treaty bonds are still said to have "the
enormous advantages of the new Soviet federation," which
would foil the plans of "all kinds of separatists,
chauvinists, and nationalists" who are trying to "deal a
decisive blow to perestroika which threatens their
far-reaching aims."121 Whatever the nominal power
relations in a new union treaty, the old economic
realities would preserve Central Asia's de facto colonial
position vis-a-vis Russian industry. Moreover, the
"economic logic" of continued ties to Russia would make
it that much more difficult to alter the pattern, and
Central Asia would have to go on supplying raw materials
for still higher priced Russian manufactures constructed
under the Soviet regime.
Second is Moscow's "Revival of Islam" offensive.
After the Bolshevik revolution, the Oriental Institute
was gradually Bolshevized and attached to the USSR
Academy of Sciences. It was reorganized many times
between the late 1920s and late 1950s. The "Muslim
Spiritual Boards" were revived in 1941, seemingly along
the very same lines as under the tsars. The new Islamic
ulama is trained by the state.
Both tsarist and Soviet regimes have blamed "Islam"
for anti- colonial actions by the Central Asians against
Russian conquest, colonization, economic exploitation,
political discrimination, and russification. Many
repressions by the center have been carried out to
suppress alleged Islamic movements, "Pan-Islamism" in the
last century, "Islamic fundamentalism" today. The "usual
suspects" are targets: "zealots, fanatics, feudal
remnants..." Gorbachev used these accusations the day
before ordering troops to open fire in Baku in January
1990. More recently, a "senior member" of the Oriental
Institute (Leningrad) has spoken of the danger of an
"Islamic Explosion." The speaker stated that the
"European- centered approach to Islam" had caused the USSR
to pursue incorrect policies in Central Asia. He
advocated the rejection of that approach in favor of one
that treats Islam on its own terms.122
The Orientalist's words may have been meant to
incite a debate within the Western scholarly community
concerning perestroika in academe. The wish in the Soviet
Oriental Institute may have been to keep the Western
specialists too busy to pay attention to these demands
Central Asia shares with other nationalities. This
treatment of Islam is not only not new, it continues to
err in the same way as before --attributing all of the
grievances of the Central Asians to Islam, as if Moscow's
understanding of Islam can help the government make
better cotton policies. Is it lack of understanding Islam
that led to the destruction of the Aral Sea?
Further, by the continuing attribution of unrest to
Islam, the government signals the West that no action is
too drastic to quell it. If Western analysts grasped more
clearly that national autonomy or political liberty were
at the root of Central Asian discontent, Western
governments might look upon it with a very different eye,
one less tolerant of Moscow's use of force. Along
the same lines, Moscow employs a "Sociological Approach."
The anti-religious campaigns that started in the 1920s by
the Bezbozhnik (Godless) League later became the task of
the "Institutes of Scientific Atheism." The next step now
appears to be embodied in the Institutes of Sociology,
fathoming the depths of the society, attempting to
conduct an opinion poll to determine the hold of Islam in
Central Asia. A Soviet journal reportedly published one
such survey, which revealed, contrary to the official
line, that the USSR had not become a land of convinced
atheists; Religious beliefs are not declining every year;
Religion is not confined to more "backward groups"
--women, the elderly.123
What probably began as a means of keeping
responsible committees informed, may now be a public
relations tool as well. Under the authority of a
"Scientific Institute," the results can be disseminated
and endorsed to form the bases of future actions. It
can also serve as the seal of approval from the
"intelligentsia," supporting the actions of the Center.
A recent program announced by several US scholarly
societies and associations aims to develop Soviet
Sociological Research Projects. One hopes that such an
endeavor would develop to remove the abuses of such
"opinion poll taking."
An especially popular, if unimaginative, tool of the
Soviet government is "Corruption Charges." Since the
Andropov period, several cycles of corruption charges
have been brought against the Central Asians. Throughout
the USSR, there are no doubt genuine cases of
corruption as defined in a democratic society: influence
peddling, embezzlement, bribe taking, skimming money from
the cotton crop. On the other hand, some of these charges
appear trumped- up to root out Central Asian efforts to
gain some measure of local control over their own
economy. What is labelled corruption by the Center, can be
directly aimed at independently minded Central Asian
elites. During the Gorbachev period, a similar crackdown
was undertaken.124 The Special Prosecutors were later
accused of using "inhuman methods to extract confessions"
from the suspects. Soon afterward, the former Prosecutors
themselves came under investigation for their excesses.
Gorbachev also attributed the problems in
Transcaucasia to "representatives of the shadow
economy," i.e. the sort of entrepreneurship which
perestroika purported to allow. This not only cast
aspersions on the nature of his economic "restructuring,"
but also suggested that he nurtured a different vision
of perestroika for Central Asians than for Russians or
Balts.
Failing verbal dissuasion and political pressure,
Gorbachev has been as willing as his predecessors to use
force. He coupled it with justification, another tactic
for international opinion that may be called "The Stick"
(or, the Praise for the Armed Forces"). The use of lethal
force during January 1990 in Azerbaijan, in the city of
Baku was also meant as a demonstration to Central Asia.
Similar brutality was used against Kazakhs in 1986,125
and Georgians in 1989, though it was worse in Baku where
two hundred or more were killed by the Red Army. Later,
Gorbachev warmly praised the armed forces for keeping
order and warned the Soviet media not to engage in
anti- Army propaganda. The message was clear: if you do
not accept our political solutions, we shall use
Leninist-Stalinist muscle, no matter what the new
vocabulary. The citizens of the Baltic Republics, along
with those Central Asians have been experiencing this
"stick."
Moscow seems to create conditions in which it can
use force. The decision to "announce," or "leak the news"
of the settlement of Armenians in Tajikistan antagonized
the housing- poor Tajiks. It is inconceivable that Moscow
would not have anticipated a Tajik response. The media,
predictably, report on "a Muslim population's violence."
Such manipulation was by no means isolated. The retired
KGB General Oleg Kalugin stated that the KGB probably had
a role in inciting the anti-Armenian violence in Baku:
"Naturally, it is their job to stir up everyone against
everyone else." Kalugin sharply criticized the Moscow
leadership for withholding information on the KGB's
involvement in Sumgait and in Tbilisi.126 In this light,
perhaps the events connected with the Kirghiz-Ozbek,
Georgian-Ossetian, Ozbek-Meskhetian127 confrontations of
1989-1990, and the Kazakh-Russian "incident" of 1986,
ought to be reexamined as well.128 Even the center's
support for creating of "hostage" pockets in ethnically
uniform populations seems aimed at diluting homogenous
areas capable of mounting national movements and to incite
inter- ethnic enmity.129
If "the Stick" was applied to Central Asia, "the
Carrot" is used elsewhere. The invitation to the West to
believe that the USSR has been trying very hard to become
just a Western democracy was yet another aspect of the
image manipulation. Anyone in the West expressing doubts
as to the genuineness of the Soviet efforts was dubbed "a
grave digger of perestroika." Further, Soviet spokesmen
stated that they "are confident that West would decide
against those individuals."130 To fortify the image of
efforts being expended to make the transition to a
Western type democracy, a number of other public
relations demarches were also undertaken. Authorities
grant exit visas to Jews, and hold talks with the Iranian
government on border crossing points for the Azerbaijan
Turks. These, of course, addressed the humanitarian
issues raised in the West with respect to reuniting
divided families.
Whether or not the Center was expecting "Anarchy in
Central Asia," Moscow clearly anticipated Western
impatience with "turmoil," especially if it threatens to
upset the status- quo. This appears to be true even when
the elements of the existing government, which
assaulted human rights throughout its existence,
attempted to seize power in a coup and the challenge is
mounted by a population seeking to regain its
independence. Nonetheless, current democracies seem to
prefer dealing with one great power they know than
numerous new and small powers. The view is similar to
those when the Bolshevik regime was in its infancy but
Great Powers at Versailles refused to recognize
independence of most tsarist colonies except Poland and
the Baltic. Such refusal policies are more easily justified
when those groups seeking independence can be dismissed as
"fanatical" or at least "anti- democratic;" even if the
challenged power is not democraticor democratically
elected.
As if to help his Western counterparts support him
and the empire --and in case Moscow decides to use force
as in Azerbaijan-- Gorbachev provides justification for
their fears and his use of force. Russian spokesmen
continue to claim in the 1990s that they "civilized"
Central Asia, protected and fed it. Western observers
seem rarely to ask how Russia "civilized" a demonstrably
older civilization than itself, from whom Russia protects
Central Asia, or how the Central Asians managed to feed
themselves before the arrival of the Russians and their
cotton agenda.

Perspective on the "Post-openness" prospects

President Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1945, in his
famed 5 October 1937 "Quarantine speech," stated:
...Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and
respect the equal right of their neighbors to be
free and live in peace, must work together for the
triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace,
justice and confidence may prevail in the world.
There must be a return to a belief in the pledged word, in
the value of a signed treaty. There must be
recognition of the fact that national morality is a vital as
private morality.... It ought to be inconceivable that in
this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation
could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of
plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating,
in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of
other nations that have done them no real harm and
are too weak to protect themselves adequately.131

World War II began two years after this speech. It
would not be a credible assertion today to claim that the
Central Asians are preparing to attack the Russian
Federation. But the Russians are behaving just as Hitler
did in the period when F. D. Roosevelt gave his speech:
demanding more land.
The coup attempt of August 1991 might represent a
new turn in Russian politics. Whether this turn is
towards true democracy with its full implication of
freedom, or a turn towards yet another kind of Russian
domination, it is too early to surmise. Some
pronouncements from the "center," immediately after the
failure of the hardliner's coup attempt, began talking of
"border adjustments" in favor of the Russian Federation
should the republics opt to secede. Those "adjustments"
are precisely in the areas where the Russians have earlier
expropriated lands from other nationalities; for example,
in Kazakistan.132 A "border agreement" was soon signed
between the Russian Federation and Kazakistan. The
Bolshevik leadership, too, had signed a variety of
agreements with the Bashkurts and other Central Asian
polities in the 1920s but shortly afterward disregarded
them as "so much paper."133 It was also the USSR that
signed the United Nations Charter in 1945, and the very
next day demanded land from another UN Charter Member, the
Turkish Republic; precisely in the areas covered in the
1921 border treaty signed between the two states.134 The
idea is still not abondoned in Moscow, or the Russian
circles, and public policy speeches are being delivered
on the subject.135 In fact, the newly constituted Russian
Rapid Deployment Forces are also seen as the instruments
of this policy, in preparation for anticipated action.
The ostensible reason, of course, is going to be the
"protection of Russians" in "those" territories. This is
clearly seen in the behavior of the 14th Russian/CIS Army
in Moldova during 1991 and 1992.
Russians have no significant experience with
democracy. Many Russian thinkers and groups have fought
democracy at every turn.136 Slavophiles and even some
Westernizers of the 19th century tsarist empire preferred
an "organic link" of autocrat and subjects to the
artificial guarantees of constitutions and the rule of
law. Though the tsar declared Chaadaev insane to
discredit his "dangerous" notions,137 it was society that
produced the People's Will terrorists, the Union of the
Russian People,138 Lenin, and Stalin and Dzerzhinsky,139
who despite their actual ethnic origins, sprang from the
ruling Russian society. Konstantin Pobedenostsev, legal
scholar, head of Holy Synod and tutor to Alexander III
and Nicholas II, wrote of "The Falsehood of
Democracy."140 The lack of a Russian legal consciousness
or sense of legality has been analyzed.141 It was an
environment in which private initiative was always
suspect. What caused the citizen to heed the commands of
the state was not a sense of citizenship, or civil
consciousness, but compulsion, often coercion by the
state. After the fall of the tsarist regime and its
Okhrana, that body's place was taken by the Bolshevik
Cheka, and its successors.
Two days "at the barricades" during August 1991,
around the Russian Federation Parliament, is not likely
to transform and "democratize" the deeply autocratic
experiences of the Russian tradition. Yeltsin's
proclamation that Russia had "saved democracy for Russia
and the world" gave no hope that "democratic Russia"
--should it ever materialize-- forsaw any place for non-
Russian democracy.
After the failed coup of August 1991, the Central
Asians have again taken to organizing and publicly
articulating their wide ranging grievances. To restrict
our view of Central Asia's troubles to the economic realm
alone is to overlook the essential threat to their
conscious existence as a people. Overt demonstrations
against economic policy or political administration
have been possible only rarely. But Russian and Soviet
cultural policies have affected the way the Central
Asians could see themselves and describe their custom and
past for future generations. Recovery of the true sources
of history and regeneration of the true identity has been
in progress, continuing a conflict in the cultural realm
that Central Asia conducted againts tsarist policy a
century ago. Political and cultural responses are
different aspects of the same struggle for greater control
over their own lives and land. Whether the
former Communists leadership of Central Asian polities
have also reformed themselves overnight, as they have
stated, remains to be seen.
At the moment Boris Yeltsin, career communist, is
now regarded as the "Savior" of democracy in Russia, and
as its guide. "A nation's guides are those who can awaken
their people from their witless slumber of ignorance....
The Savior of every tribe shall come."142 If the awaited
savior causes harm to other "tribes" in the process,
knowingly or not, there can be vast repercussions. This
is also true of the former Communist leadership in
Central Asia. "Four freedoms" are enshrined in the United
Nations Charter. If the "Four Freedoms" cease to apply
uniformly, they may cease to exist alltogether.

October 1991

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NATIONALITY OR RELIGION?
Views of Central Asian Islam

H. B. Paksoy, D. Phil.

[Published in AACAR Bulletin (of the Association for
the Advancement of Central Asian Research) Vol. VIII,
No. 2, Fall, 1995]

Part 4 of 4

NOTES:

1. Gavin Hambly, Editor, Central Asia (London, 1969).
First English Edition.

2. The designation "Tatar" is found in the Orkhon-Yenisey
stelea, erected beginning early 7th c. See T. Tekin, A
Grammar of Orkhon Turkic (Indiana, 1968), Uralic and
Altaic Series, Vol. 69, which contains the texts and
their English translations. The latin "Tartarus," meaning
"the infernal regions of Roman and Greek mythology,
hence, hell" had already came into use through chronicles
written by the clergy of Europe. Perhaps St. Louis of
France was the first, in 1270, to apply this unrelated
term to the troops of Chinggis Khan.

3. Timur (or Temur) Bey, was wounded in a battle, which
caused him to become lame. Therefore, in some Turkish
sources he is sometimes referred to as Aksak Timur. Arab
sources call him Amir Timur. In Persian sources, he
became Timur-i leng. Hence, the corruption. See Ahmad Ibn
Arabshah, Tamarlane or Timur the Great Amir, J. H.
Sanders, Tr. (London, 1936); idem, The Timurnama or
Ajayabul magfur fi akhbar-i Timur, H. S. Jarrett
(Calcutta, 1882); Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise and Rule
of Tamarlane (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

4. The poem "Kubla Khan" by Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(1772-1834) is another example of this "abundance of
enthusiasm."

5. Kirghiz are also found in the Orkhon-Yenisey stelea.
See Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic. See also Remy Dor
and Guy Imart, Etre Kirghiz au XXme sicle (Marseilles:
Universite de Provence, 1982).

6. For the nature and compositions of confederation
structures, see "Z. V. Togan: On the Origins of the
Kazakhs and the Ozbeks" H. B. Paksoy, Editor, Central
Asia Reader (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

7. See H. B. Paksoy, "A. A. Divay : Intellectual Heritage
and Quiet Defiance." Presented to the 21st annual Middle
East Studies Association meeting, Baltimore, 1987. An
abstract may be found in Turkish Studies Association
Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 1. (1988), Pp.22-23.

8. See H. B. Paksoy, "Introduction." (as Special Editor
of "Muslims in the Russian Empire: Response to Conquest")
Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 & 4,
Autumn/Winter 1986; idem, "Chora Batir: A Tatar
Admonition to Future Generations." Studies in
Comparative Communism Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 & 4, Autumn/Winter
1986.

9. A German born and trained compiler of Turkish
materials, 1837-1918.

10. (Bloomington and The Hague, 1967).

11. Since 1917, many studies have been made of the
so-called language reforms in the USSR, making some
outrageous claims. Those Soviet propagandist assertions
include "giving new languages" to the various
"nationalities." For details, among others, see
especially Z. V. Togan, Turkili Turkistan (Istanbul,
1981) 3rd. Ed.; Stefan Wurm, Turkic Peoples of the USSR:
Their Historical Background, their Language, and the
Development of Soviet Linguistic Policy (Oxford, 1954);
idem, The Turkic Languages of Central Asia: Problems of
Planned Culture Contact (Oxford, 1954).

12. The person in question is Eduard Volodin. The
implication of this statement, in the context of authors'
arguments, is that Altai is now considered a part of
Russia to be preserved in case of dissolution of the
Soviet Union. An earlier version of the discussion in
this section was disseminated: see H. B. Paksoy,
"Perspectives on the Unrest in the Altai Region of the
USSR" Report on the USSR (Electronic version, on
Sovset), September 1990. See also R. L. Canfield, "Soviet
Gambit in Central Asia" Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies Vol. 5, No. 1.

13. See Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic.

14. Kasgarli Mahmud, Kitab Diwan Lugat at Turk. Completed
ca. A. D. 1074?/ 1077. Editio Princeps by Kilisli Rifat
(3 Vols.) (Istanbul, 1917-19). English Translation by R.
Dankoff with J. Kelly as Compendium of Turkic Dialects (3
Vols.) (Cambridge, MA., 1982-84).

15. For "treaty" details, see J. R. V. Prescott, Map of
Mainland Asia by Treaty (Melbourne, 1975).

16. For an early study on the subject, see Helene Carrre
d'Encaussee, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist
Republics in Revolt (NY, 1979); Paul B. Henze, "Marx on
Russians and Muslims" Central Asian Survey Vol 6, No. 4
1987.

17. For a discussion of the subject, see Hisao Komatsu,
"Bukhara in the Central Asian Perspective: Group Identity
in 1911-1928" Research Report on Urbanism in Islam
(University of Tokyo, 1988) No. 2; also Nazif Shahrani,
"'From Tribe to Umma': Comments on the Dynamics of
Identity in Muslim Central Asia" Central Asian Survey
Vol. 3, No. 3 (1984).

18. Such insistence also found its way into the Soviet
Census of 1939, whose compilers were shot when accused by
Stalin for underestimating the population. One surmises,
the real reason for the liquidation of the Census
compilers that they affirmed by numbers what was known in
the earlier Censuses: the ethnic Russians constituted
less than half of the total Soviet population.

19. For the Moscow's attempts to write a history for
Central Asians, see L. Tillett, The Great
Friendship (Chapel Hill, 1969).

20. According to the late I. Kafesoglu, the original
religion of the Turks was the worship of Tangri, a
monotheistic belief, quite different from shamanism.
See his Turk Milli Kuluturu (Istanbul, 1984) (3rd Ed)
Pp. 295-7, and the sources cited therein. Grousset,
in Empire of the Steppes (N. Walford Tr.)
(New Brunswick-NJ, 1970) identifies the word Tangri
as Turkic and Mongol, meaning "Heaven" (p. 20);
he states (p. 23) that the Hsiung-nu (considered as
Turks and often identified with the Huns)
practiced a religion that "was a vague shamanism based on
the cult of Tangri or Heaven and on the worship of
certain sacred mountains." Based on Pelliot and Thomsen,
he seems to confirm Kafesoglu's contention of monotheism,
but still related to shamanism:
"The moral concepts (in the Kul Tegin stela)... are
borrowed from the old cosmogony which formed the basis
of Turko-Mongol shamanism... Heaven and earth obeyed a
supreme being who inhabited the highest level of the
sky and who was known by the name of Divine Heaven or
Tangri." (p. 86).

"Tengri" (in this form) is referenced in Tekin, A Grammar
of Orkhon Turkic; Mahmud, Kitab Diwan Lugat at Turk.
Consult also M. Eliade, Shamanism; Archaic Techniques of
Ecstasy (Princeton, 1974), 2nd Printing, who identifies
Tangri only as one god of the Yakut (p. 471); elsewhere
he describes the hierarchy of gods (Chapter 6).

21. R. N. Frye, "Zoroastrier in der islamischen Zeit"
Der Islam (Berlin) 41, 1965; idem, The History of Ancient
Iran (1958); idem, The Heritage of Persia (1963).

22. Mary Boyce, Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and
Practices (1984); idem, A History of Zoroastrianism
(1975-1991) 3 Vols. (Vol. 3 with Franz Grenet).

23. R. N. Frye, "The Iranicization of Islam," delivered
at the University of Chicago (May 1978) as the annual
Marshall Hodgson Memorial Lecture. Printed in R. N. Frye,
Islamic Iran and Central Asia: 7th-12th centuries
(London: Variorum, 1979).

24. R. N. Frye, The History of Bukhara (Cambridge, Mass.
1954). See also Michael Zand, "Bukharan Jews"
Encyclopedia Iranica, Ehsan Yarshater, Ed. Vol IV, fasc.
5. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989).

25. Colin Mackerras, Ed., Tr., The Uighur Empire
According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories: A Study in
Sino-Uighur Relations 744-840 (University of South
Carolina Press, 1972); A. von Gabain, Das Leben im
uigirischen Knigreich von Qoo 850-1250 (Otto
Harrassowitz, 1973).

26. R. N. Frye and A. M. Sayili, "The Turks of Khurasan
and Transoxiana at the Time of the Arab Conquest" The
Moslem World XXXV. (Hartford) 1945, concerning the Turks
of Transoxiana prior to the arrival of Islam.

27. See Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic.

28. Grousset, Empire of the Steppes; further, W.
Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion (London,
1977) 4th edition; Christopher Beckwith, The Tibetan
Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for
Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese
during the Early Middle Ages (Princeton, 1987); R. W.
Dunnell, Tanguts and the Tangut State of Ta Hsia
(University Microfilms International, 1983).

29. See "M. Ali--Let us Learn our Inheritance: Get to
Know Yourself" Central Asia Reader, H. B. Paksoy, Editor,
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); "Sun is also Fire."
Central Asian Monuments, H. B. Paksoy, Editor, (Istanbul:
ISIS Press, 1992).

30. W. Bartold, in Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion
(London, 1977) 4th Ed. (P. 195-196) states "...according
to the narrative of the Arabic historian, probably
exaggerated, as many as 50,000 Chinese were killed and
about 20,000 taken prisoner, but in the Chinese records
the whole army of Kao-hsien-chih is given as 30,000
men...but it is undoubtedly of great importance....
In 752 the ruler of Usrushana begged help against the
Arabs from the Chinese, but met with a refusal."

31. See C. E. Bosworth, The Gaznavids: Their Empire in
Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994-1040 (Beirut, 1973)
(2nd Ed.); F. Sumer Oguzlar (Turkmenler) (Istanbul, 1980)
(3rd. Ed.); Thomas Barfield, The Central Asian Arabs of
Afghanistan: Pastoral Nomadism in Transition (Austin-TX,
1981).

32. Peter Golden, Khazar Studies (Budapest, 1980); D. M.
Dunlop, The History of the Jewish Khazars, (Princeton,
1954); N. Golb, O. Pritsak, Khazarian Hebrew Documents
(Ithaca, 1982); Turks, Hungarians and Kipchaks: A
Festschrift in Honor of Tibor Halasi- Kun. P. Oberling,
Editor, Special issue of Journal of Turkish Studies Vol.
8. 1984.

33. Beginning with the "Kok-Turk" alphabet of the
Orkhon-Yenisei, that is regarded unique to them; later
Uyghur (which is modified Sogdian); Hebrew; Arabic;
Latin.

34. Peter Golden, "Codex Comanicus" Central Asian
Monuments H. B. Paksoy, Editor, (Istanbul: ISIS Press,
1992). The only known copy of the Codex Comanicus is in
the Venice library. It should be noted that, the Uyghur
Turks wrote eulogies to Buddha; the Ottomans, to
Muhammad.

35. Although Ottoman became a "constructed" language,
taking elements of Turkish, Arabic and Persian via the
development of the Ottoman court poetry. More books
of statecraft were written, in Ottoman, in the 16th
and the 17th centuries.

36. O. Pritsak, "Karachanidische Streitfragen 1-4"
Oriens II. (Leiden, 1950).

37. Followed by the Khwarazm-Shahs 1156-1230, and
preceded by the Gaznavids 994-1186. Akkoyunlu dynasty,
another tribal confederation related to the Oghuz/Seljuk
ruled in the 15th century. For the Oghuz, See F. Sumer,
Oguzlar (Turkmenler) (Istanbul, 1980) 3rd. Ed.

38. A Century of Princes: Sources on Timurid History and
Art, W. M. Thackston (Tr.) (Cambridge, MA., 1989).

39. S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman
Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University Press,
1976-1978) Two Vols. Second Printing 1978.

40. Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar Historical
Consciousness: Shihabddin Mercani and the Image of Golden
Horde" Central Asian Survey Vol. 9, No. 2 (1990); idem,
"Tribal Politics and Social Organization" Unpublished PhD
dissertation (Columbia, 1986).

41. Ibn Battuta, From Travels in Asia and Africa:
1325-1354 H. A.R. Gibb (Tr.) (New York, 1929); see also
the bibliography in Ross E. Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn
Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century (Berkeley,
1986).

42. Bosworth, The Gaznavids, P. 205.

43. Kasgarli Mahmud, Kitab Diwan Lugat at Turk.

44. Ettuhfet uz zakiyye fil lugat it Turkiyye. Besim
Atalay, Ed., Tr. (Istanbul, 1945). Atalay provides an
introduction to place the work in its context.

45. See Theodor Noldeke, (tr.) (Bombay, 1930). See also W.
L. Hanaway, "Epic Poetry" Ehsan Yarshater, Editor,
Persian Literature (Ithaca: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988);
R. L. Canfield, Editor, Turco-Persia in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

46. Elizabeth Endicott-West, Mongolian Rule in China
(Harvard, 1989); Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, His Life
and Times (Berkeley, 1988); Thomas Allsen, Mongol
Imperialism (Berkeley, 1987).

47. See Lt. Col. Sir Wolseley Haig & Sir Richard Burn
(Eds.) The Cambridge History of India (1922-1953), Vol
III, Turks and Afghans (1928). M. G. S. Hodgson, in his
The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World
Civilization (Chicago, 1974), 3 Vols., suggests that the
above cited 1928 volume is written from the now outdated
British Empire point of view. See also V. Smith, Oxford
History of India (Oxford, 1958).

48. Rashid al-Din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, trans.
by John A. Boyle (New York, 1971). For example, the
Akkoyunlu had no wish to come under Ottoman or Safavid
dominion. See John Woods, The Aqqoyunlu Clan,
Confederation, Empire: A Study in 15th/9th Century
Turco-Iranian Politics (Minneapolis, 1976).

49. Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Muhsin
Mahdi, Tr. (Free Press/Macmillan, 1962).

50. Known in the West as Avicenna. See Avicenna:
Scientist and Philosopher. G. M. Wickens, Ed. (London,
1952).

51. For additional personae, see for example The
Cambridge History of Islam, P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton
and B. Lewis (Eds.). (Cambridge University Press, 1970) 4
Vols.; Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples,
J. Charmichael & M. Perlmann (Tr.) (London, 1948). 7th
Printing, 1982.

52. Aydin Sayili, Logical Necessities in Mixed Equations
by 'Abd al Hamid ibn Turk and the Algebra of his Time
(Ankara, 1962).

53. Timur's grandson, who ruled Samarkand and environs,
author ofprincipal astronomical and mathematical works
which were translated into Western languages beginning
with the 17th century. See Ulugh Bey Calendar, John
Greaves, Savilian Professorof Astronomy, Tr. (Oxford,
1652). Ulug Beg's works influenced European studies on
the subject. Bartold utilized a French translation by
Sedillot, Prolgomnes des tables astronomiques d'Oloug-beg
(Paris, 1847-53). See Barthold, Four Studies on the
History of Central Asia Vol. II, Ulug Beg. (Leiden,
1963). For a more detailed bibliography, see Kevin
Krisciunas, "The Legacy of Ulugh Beg" H. B. Paksoy,
Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press,
1992).

54. Muhammad ibn Musa al Khwarazmi, Kitab al Mukhtasar fi
Hisab al Jabr wa'l Muqabala, F. Rosen, Editor,
Translator, (London, 1830).

55. The Babur-Nama in English, (Memoirs of Babur) Anette
S. Beveridge, Tr. (London, 1922). It has been reprinted
in 1969. See also Muhammad Haidar, A History of the
Moghuls of Central Asia Being the Tarikh-i Reshidi of
Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlad, E. D. Ross, Translator; N.
Elias, Editor, (London, 1898). Reprint (New York, 1970).

56. Huseyin Baykara (r. 1469-1506), a direct descendent
of Timur, ruled Herat and Khorasan. His contemporary,
friend and boon- companion Navai is exemplified as the
ultimate literati of this period. Reportedly of Uyghur
descent, Navai (1441-1501) wrote voluminously and with
apparent ease in Chaghatay, a Turk dialect, and Persian,
and concomitantly was the long-time serving 'prime
minister' to Huseyin Baykara. Much of Navai's writings
remain untranslated. For his collected works, see A. S.
Levend, Ali Sir Nevai (Ankara: Turk Dil Kurumu, 1965-68)
4 Vols.

57. Fuzuli, Kulliyat-i Divan-i Fuzuli (Istanbul,
1308/1891); idem, Turkce Divan. K. Akyuz, S. Beken, S.
Yuksel, M. Cumhur, Eds. (Ankara, 1958); idem, Eserler
(Baku, 1958). See also Keith Hitchins, "Fuzuli [pseudonym
of Muhammad ibn Suleiman]" The Modern Encyclopedia of
Russian and Soviet Literatures. Harry B. Weber, Ed.
(Academic International Press, 1987) Vol. 8.

58. Roger M. Savory, Iran under the Safavids (Cambridge
University Press, 1980).

59. For example, see Muhammed Salih, Shaibani-nama
(Chaghatay text) (St. Peterburg, 1908).

60. Maria Eva Subtelny, "Art and Politics in Early 16th
Century Central Asia" Central Asiatic Journal Vol. 27,
No. 1-2 (1983); idem, "The Poetic Circle at the Court of
the Timurid Sultan Husain Baiqara, and its Political
Significance." Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Harvard
University, 1979).

61. The identification was first made by Kasgarli Mahmud
in Diwan Lugat at Turk, as a branch of the Turks.

62. A History of the Seljuks: Ibrahim Kafesoglu's
Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy Gary Leiser
(Tr., Ed) (Southern Illinois University Press, 1988).

63. According to Y. Bregel, in his Introduction to the
facsimile of Munis and Agahi's Firdaws al-Ikbal: History
of Khorezm (Leiden, 1988), the latter was completed c.
1665 by another person. Secere-i Turk is rather difficult
to locate, causing a determination of the sources for the
translated works tenuous. This is especially true with
respect to the early French and English translations:
[Bentinck] Historie Genealogique des Tatars (Leiden,
1726) Two Vols.; Abu Al Ghazi Bahadur, A History of the
Turks, Moguls, and Tatars, Vulgarly called Tartars,
Together witha Description of the Countries They Inhabit
(London, 1730) Two Vols.; [Miles] Genealogical Tree of
the Turks and Tatars (London,1838). Imperial Russian
Academy at St. Petersburg published a facsimile of
Terakime in 1871, edited by Desmaisons, who later
prepared a French translation. A modern-day translation
is long overdue. See H. F. Hofman Turkish Literature: A
Bio- Bibliographical Survey (Utrecht, 1969) for
additional comments. Dr. Riza Nur endeavored to
popularize the genre with his edition of Turk Seceresi
(Istanbul, 1343/1925). One of the earlier Russian
translations prepared is Rodoslovnoe drevno tiurkov,
(Kazan, 1906), with an afterword by N. Katanov
(1862-1922). Apparently this 1906 version was not
published until 1914, minus Katanov's name from the title
page, and his afterword from the body of the book. See A.
N. Kononov, Rodoslovnaia Turkmen (Moscow-Leningrad,
1958), page 181. In order to understand the reason, one
must turn to Z. V. Togan's memoirs, Hatiralar, where
Togan relates an incident taking place prior to 1917,
when Katanov poured his heart to Togan.

64. See H. B. Paksoy, Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity
under Russian Rule (Hartford, CT: Association for the
Advancement of Central Asian Research, Monograph Series,
1989), p. 1.

65. Z. V. Togan compiled his version Oguz Destani:
Residettin Oguznamesi, Tercume ve Tahlili (Istanbul,
1972) (published posthumously) from twelve manuscripts.
Though originally composed and later put down on paper in
a Turkish dialect prior to 13th century, it was widely
rendered into Persian. Known translations include
Oughouz-name, epopee turque, Riza Nur (Tr.) (Societe de
publications Egyptiennes: Alexandrie, 1928); Die Legende
von Oghuz Qaghan. W. Bang and R. Arat (Eds.) (Sitzb. d.
Preuss. Akad. D. Wiss. 1932. Phil.-Histr. K1. XXV,
Berlin). To my knowledge, there is no English rendition
as yet. See also D. Sinor, "Oguz Kagan Destani Uzerine
Bazi Mulahazalar" Turk Dili ve Edebiyati Dergisi, 1952
(Tr. from French by A. Ates); Faruk Sumer's book length
article, "Oguzlar'a Ait Destani Mahiyetde Eserler" Ankara
Universitesi DTC Fakultesi Dergisi, 1959; and the
Introduction of G. L. Lewis to The Book of Dede Korkut
(London, 1982), Second Printing.

66. Munis and Agahi, Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of
Khorezm.

67. Ali Shir Navai, Muhakemat al-lughateyn, Robert
Devereux, Tr. (Leiden, 1966).

68. Although there are some incuding guidence to sensual
pleasures, such as the Persian Kabusnama. Nizam al-Mulk,
The Book of Government, H. Darke (Tr.) (Yale University
Press, 1960), is acombination of autobiography (written
partly to exonerate himself), and political advice to two
Seljuk rulers.

69. The language of Kutadgu Bilig (Completed A. D. 1069)
echoes the above referenced Orkhon-Yenisey inscriptions.
A Turkish edition is: Yusuf Has Hacib, Kutadgu Bilig. R.
R. Arat, Editor, (Ankara, 1974) (2nd Ed.). KB is
translated into English as Wisdomof Royal Glory by R.
Dankoff (Chicago, 1983).

70. Concerning related issues, see Janet Martin, Treasure
of the Land of Darkness: A Study of the Fur Trade in
Medieval Russia (Cambridge University Press, 1986); Azade
Ayse Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National
Resilience (Hoover, 1986); Alan W. Fisher, Crimean Tatars
(Hoover, 1978); A. Bennigsen & Chantal
Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union ((NY &
London, 1967). A. Bennigsen & Marie Broxup, The Islamic
Threat to the Soviet State (London, 1983); Uli
Schamiloglu, "Umdet l-Ahbar and the Turkic Narrative
Sources for the Golden Horde and the Later Golden Horde"
Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992).

71. Also known as qumiss, etc. See, inter alia, Kasgarli
Mahmud, Kitab Diwan Lugat at Turk (P. 184). It is still
an immensely popular drink, contains --due to the
fermentation process in its preparation-- natural
alcohol. However, it is not in the same category as hard
liquor, possessing much less intoxicating agents.
Russians became aware of the nourishing and rejuvenating
qualities of kimiz after their occupation of Kazakhstan.
Currently, several sanatoriums are operating in the
Kazakh steppe where ingestion of kimiz is the primary
dietetic and therapeutic prescription, especially against
diagnosed tuberculosis. Probably this discovery of the
beneficial effects of kimiz on TB caused Moscow to
reconsider and relax the sovhoz-kolhoz rules in the area,
in order to insure the maintenance of large herds of
mares necessary to supply the sanatoriums where the CPSU
Officialdom is treated.

72. On the social position of women in Central Asia, even
at the turn of the 20th c., see Z. V. Togan, Hatiralar
(Istanbul, 1969).

73. Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam
(University of North Carolina Press, 1975); See also J.
Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford,
1971).

74. See also A. Bennigsen and S. E. Wimbush, Mystics and
Commisars (London, 1985), which contains a sizeable
bibliography from the Soviet perspective. For the
response of al-Ghazali (1058-1111), to Farabi (ca.
870-950), see The Faith and Practice of a-Ghazali, W.
Montgomery Watt, Tr. (London, 1953). See also Devin
DeWeese, "The Eclipse of the Kubraviyah in Central Asia"
Iranian Studies Vol. XXI, No. 1-2, 1988; idem,
Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).

75. He is believed to have died in 1166. Ahmet Yesevi's
Hikmet appears to have been first published in Kazan, in
1878 or 1879. For a treatment of Yesevi, and an annotated
bibliography, see Fuad Koprulu, Turk Edebiyatinda Ilk
Mutasavviflar (Ankara, 1981). Fourth Ed.

76. For example, Bukhara of the 19th century. Fazlur
Rahman, Islam (Chicago,1966); M. G. S. Hodgson, The
Venture of Islam. Vol. 2.

77. Audrey L. Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1992) Studies of Nationalities
in the USSR; idem, "The Forgotten Factor: The Shi'i
Mullahs in Pre- Revolutionary Baku," Passe Turco-Tatar,
Present Sovietique, Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Giles
Veinstein, S. Enders Wimbush (Eds.) (Louvain/Paris,
1986).

78. S. Becker, Russian Protectorates in Central Asia:
Bukhara and Khiva 1865-1924 (Harvard, 1968).

79. The Russian missionary in question is N. Ostroumov.
Reporting the statement is Husamettin Tugac, Bir Neslin
Drami (Istanbul, 1975). P. 159-160. Tugac learned of
Ostroumov's story in 1918 while making his way through
Central Asia, on the way to Istanbul, after escaping from
a tsarist prison in the vicinity of the Mongolian border.
For another example of Ostroumov's activity, see Z. V.
Togan, Turkili Turkistan as personally observed by Togan.
An English excerpt of Togan's observations is in H. B.
Paksoy, Alpamysh, P. 19.

80. Tacitus, The Agricola and the Germania, H. Mattingly,
Tr. (London, 1948). Pp. 62-63. Agricola was the
Father-in-law of Tacitus, the Roman military governor of
Britain at the time.

81. Tacitus, Pp. 72-73.

82. Apart from its use in textiles, etc, when processed
with acids, termed "nitrating," cotton constitutes the
basis of high grade explosives.

83. A. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917-1927 (Columbia,
1957); O. Caroe. Soviet Empire, the Turks of Central Asia
and Stalinism (London, 1953); G. Wheeler, Racial Problems
in Soviet Muslim Asia (Oxford, 1967); C. W. Warren,
Turkism and the Soviets (London, 1957); E. Allworth,
Uzbek Literary Politics (The Hague, 1964); M. Rywkin,
Moscow's Muslim Challenge (M. E. Sharpe, 1990) (Revised
ed.); E. Naby, "The Concept of Jihad in Opposition to
Communist Rule: Turkestan and Afghanistan" Studies in
Comparative Communism Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 & 4, Autumn/Winter
1986.

84. See Edward Ingram, The Beginnings of the Great Game
in Asia 1828-1834 (Oxford, 1979); idem, Commitment to
Empire: Prophecies of the Great Game in Asia 1797-1800
(Oxford, 1981); idem, In Defense of British India: Great
Britain in the Middle East 1775-1842 (London, 1984).
Although the major players were Britain and Russia,
Germany also joined later in the century and the French
were not disinterested.

85. J. R. V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty.

86. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton University
Press, 1980).

87. R. N. Frye, "Oriental Studies in Russia;" Wayne S.
Vucinich "Structure of Soviet Orientology" both in Russia
in Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian
Peoples Wayne Vucinich, Ed. (Stanford, 1972). The British
Government periodically issues reports updating the
history and structure of Oriental Studies in Great
Britain, which is stated to go back to the 15th century.
However, such efforts were thoroughly organized by the
beginning of the 20th century. See Oriental Studies in
Britain (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1975).

88. For an early treatment of the subject, see Yusuf
Akura, Uc Tarz-i Siyaset (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,
1976). Akura's analysis was first printed in the
newspaper Turk published in Cairo during 1904. For the
English version, see Three Policies, David S. Thomas,
(Tr.), H. B. Paksoy, Editor, Central Asian Monuments
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992); Francois Georgeon "Yusuf
Akura: Deuxieme Partie--Le Mouvement National des
Musulmans de Russie (1905-1908)" Central Asian Survey
Vol. 5, No. 2, 1986.

89. A. H. Vambery, Travels in Central Asia (London,
1865). Vambery masqueraded as a mendicant dervish across
Central Asia, around 1860-61. Upon his return to Europe,
he wrote several bookson his adventures. See, for
example, his Sketches of Central Asia (London, 1868). See
also C. W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets (London,
1957).
Vambery, it is now known, was in the pay of the
British Government. For archival references, see M. Kemal
Oke, "Prof. Arminius Vambery and Anglo-Ottoman Relations
1889-1907" Bulletin of the Turkish Studies Association,
Vol. 9, No. 2. 1985.

90. For example, L. Cahun's Introduction a l'Histoire de
l'Asie, Turcs, et Mongols, des Origines a 1405 (Paris,
1896) was written to suggest that a belief in racial
superiority motivated the conquests of the Mongol
Chinggiz Khan. This book was published onthe heels of the
1893-1894 Franco-Russian rapprochement, at a time when
Russia justified its conquest of Central Asia as part of
its own "civilizing mission." In the Secret History of
the Mongols, written c. 1240 A. D., after the death of
Chinggiz, there is, of course, no reference to racial
superiority. Instead, it quotes Chinggiz: "Tangri (God)
opened the gate and handed us the reins." See Mogollarin
Gizli Tarihi (A. Temir, Trans.) (Ankara, 1948), (P. 227)
indicating that Chinggiz regarded only himself ruling by
divine order. See also Francis Cleaves, Tr., Ed. The
Secret History of the Mongols (Harvard, 1982). The "Great
Khan" himself was and remained the focus of power, as
opposed to the clans under his rule. In any event, the
Mongol armies were distinctly multi-racial. See T.
Allsen, Mongol Imperialism (Berkeley, 1987); M. Rossabi,
Khubilai Khan (Berkeley, 1988).
Another representative sample of the use of the
"Pan- Turkism" bogeyman is A Manual on the Turanians and
Pan-Turanianism (Oxford: H. M. Government, Naval Staff
Intelligence Department, November 1918), a work that was
based on Vambery's Turkenvolk (Leipzig, 1885) and that it
was compiled by Sir Denison Ross, as Sir Denison later
personally informed Togan. On this work, see Togan's
comments in Turkili (Pp. 560-563). Even Alexander
Kerensky, in Paris exile after the Bolshevik Revolution,
was utilizing the same "Turanian" rhetoric, calling it "a
menace threatening the world.

91. "Pan-Islam" never did obtain a foothold in Central
Asia. Even when Enver Pasha was forced to sign
declarations to that effect during 1920-1921, his
audience had no clear conception of the specific term or
its implications. The best work on Enver, which utilizes
Enver's diaries and journals, is S. S. Aydemir,
Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pasha (Istanbul, 1974).
Three Volumes (There are several printings). Enver left
an autobiography. It was utilized by Aydemir. There is a
German translation of Enver's autobiography, in typescript,
located in the Sterling Library of the Yale University.
See also Glen Swanson "Enver Pasha: The Formative Years"
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.16, N.3., October 1980.
Azade-Ayse Rorlich provides a further view of Enver in
her "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik
Government 1918-1920" in Journal of the Royal Society
for Asian Affairs, Vol. XIII (Old Series Vol. 69),
Part III, October 1982. See also Masayuki Yamauchi, "The
Unromantic Exiles: Istanbul to Berlin --Enver Pasha
1919-1920" Research Report on Urbanism in Islam
(University of Tokyo, 1989) No. 11; idem, The Green
Crescent Under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet
Russia (Tokyo, 1991). Close colleagues and classmates of
Enver from the Ottoman Military academy left memoirs
in which Enver is featured prominently. Among those,
Marshal Fevzi akmak, General Kazim Karabekir, Ismet
Inonu and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) are notable.
Approximately half of those were written at the height
of Enver's success and powers.

92. Among many works on Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani and
Pan-Islamism, see, H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam
(Chicago, 1947); Nikki Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din
"al-Afghani:" a Political Biography, (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1972). About the Recidivist Movement of 31 March
1909, see Sina Aksin's 31 Mart Olayi (Ankara, 1970). For
the political environment of the period, see: Ernest E.
Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of
1908 (Beirut, 1965); Serif Mardin, Jon Turklerin Siyasi
Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (Ankara, 1964); Feroz Ahmad, The
Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in
Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); M. Sukru
Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal Orgut Olarak 'Osmanli Ittihat ve
Terakki Cemiyeti' ve 'Jon Turkluk' 1889-1902 Vol. I
(Istanbul, 1985); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the
Young Turk Era (Leiden, 1991).

93. Concerning this censorship, M. T. Choldin, A Fence
Around the Empire: Censorship of Western Ideas under the
Tsars (Duke University Press, 1985); B. Daniel,
Censorship in Russia (University Press of America, 1979);
Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917 (Oxford,
1967). See also Thomas Kuttner "Russian Jadidism and the
Islamic World: Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908" Cahiers
du Monde Russe et Sovietique. 16. (1975).

94. B. Allahverdiyev, Kitablar Hakkinda Kitap (Baku,
1972). For further examples, see also Edward Lazzerini,
"Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View
>From Within" Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique. 16
(1975).

95. See H. B. Paksoy, Alpamysh; M. Dewhirst and R.
Farrell, The Soviet Censorship (Metuchen-NJ, 1973); L.
Branson, "How Kremlin Keeps Editors in Line" The Times
(London) 5 January 1986. P. 1.

96. Under the influence of Peter Stolypin (1862-1911),
the author of "We Need A Great Russia" Gosudarstvennaia
Duma Stenograficheskie Otchety (St. Petersburg, 1907).
Cf. Thomas Riha, Editor, Readings in Russian Civilization
Vol. II, Imperial Russia 1700-1917, (Chicago, 1964).

97. Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917
(Oxford, 1967).

98. Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe Musul'manstvo: Mysli,
Zametkii Nablyudeniya (Simferopol, 1881) Society for
Central Asian Studies (Oxford, 1985) Reprint No. 6;
Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's
Perevodchik/Tercuman: A Clarion of Modernism" H. B.
Paksoy, Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis
Press, 1992); idem, "From Bakhchisaray to Bukharain 1893:
Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Journey to Central Asia" Central
Asian Survey Vol. 3, No. 4 (1984); idem, Ismail Bey
Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Washington, 1973); idem, "Gadidism at the Turn of the
Twentieth Century: A View From Within;" Cafer Seydahmet,
Gaspirali Ismail Bey (Istanbul, 1934).

99. For example, Annales Bertiniani of the 9th c. For
related discussion, see D. Sinor, "The Historical Role of
the Turk Empire" Journal of World History I, (1953);
Edouard Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs)
(St. Petersbourg, 1903); D. Obolensky, Cambridge Medieval
History Vol. IV, Part 1; The Legacy of Islam, Joseph
Schacht with C. E. Bosworth (Eds.) (Oxford, 1974) Second
Edition.

100. An exclamatory term, akin to the exhortation "lets
go," especially used when rounding-up or rustling
livestock.

101. See H. B. Paksoy, Alpamysh.

102. The last references are to the respective
anti-colonial movements. It should be remembered that
Togan was writing the 1920s. For a treatment, see H. B.
Paksoy, "'The Basmachi (Turkistan National Liberation
Movement)" Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and
Soviet Union, Vol. IV (Academic International Press,
1991), Pp. 5-20; idem, "Zeki Velidi Togan's Account: The
Basmachi Movement from Within," H. B. Paksoy, Editor,
Central Asia Reader (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

103. Tacitus, Pp. 65-66.

104. Conceivably, examples such as the Britons were
foremost in the minds of the men leading the 1776
American Independence movement. American Founding Fathers
may have also have been remembering the admonitions that
a republic can only exist with an educated public; and
that both the Greeks and the Romans did not heed Plato's
advice and saw the replacement of their republics with
dictatorships. (Plato's Republic has been widely
available). Hence, the early American battle-cries "Give
me liberty, or give me death," and "No taxation without
representation" were not mere accidents. The American
Founding Fathers at once began establishing secular
universities in the new republic. University of
Pennsylvania (Established as College of Philadelphia) was
founded in 1753 with the help of Benjamin Franklin
(1706-1790). George Washington (1732-1799) gave
encouragement and aid to the establishment of more than
one college, one of which still bears his name. Thomas
Jefferson (1743-1826) led the way in establishing the
University of Virginia in 1819. Later, Johns Hopkins
(1876) and University of Chicago (1892) were also founded
as secular institutions of higher learning.
As it is known, the universities established in
colonial America were first and foremost training clergy.
Later, these existing colleges and universities followed
the lead of the new institutions by revising their
curricula, giving weight to liberal arts education.

105. Y. Bregel, in his Introduction to Munis and Agahi,
Firdaws al-Ikbal: History of Khorezm notes: ".....The
West first learned about the existence of these works
through a Russian orientalist named A. L. Kuhn, who
accompanied, together with several other Russian
scholars, the Russian military expedition against Khiva
in 1873 which resulted in the capturing of Khiva and
establishing of the Russian protectorate over the
Khanate. In the Khan's palace the Russians found a great
number of archival documents and about 300 manuscripts;
they were all confiscated....Some of the publications
confiscated in Khiva by the Russians in 1873 were
transferred in 1874 to the Imperial Public Library in
Petersburg, but others were kept by Kuhn in his private
possession; these included the manuscripts of the works
by Munis and Agahi....
[From P. 54, Note 304 of the Introduction] The MS C
is slightly damaged by water from which several marginal
notes at the beginning of the MS especially suffered.
Many pages of E are also damaged by water, but it does
not appreciably affect the legibility of the text. The
cause of this damage is probably to be explained by a
story told by Palvan (Pahlavan) Mirza-bashi, the
secretary of the khan of Khiva, to a Russian official and
orientalist N. P. Ostroumov in 1891. According to this
secretary, "Kun [Kuhn] took away from Khiva about fifteen
hundred different manuscripts, but when he transported
them across [the Amu-Darya] in a boat, most of the
manuscripts got wet, and he requested about 150 mullas
from a madrasa to dry the wet copies." (Cited from
Ostroumov's diary in Lunin, Srednyaya Aziya, 345, n.
523).
It may also be stated that, there was a second
reason why Ostroumov and other Russians were seizing
manuscripts: to study and understand the Central Asians
better, to discover more effective means for control.
Subsequent publication of some of those manuscripts have
been largely confined to Soviet "nationalities
specialists," in strictly controlled circulation.

106. For further details, see H. B. Paksoy, "'The Basmachi':
Turkistan National Liberation Movement;" idem, "Zeki
Velidi Togan's Account: The Basmachi Movement from
Within."

107. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union:
Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Harvard, 1954).

108. Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow. (New York,
1982).

109. J. M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A study of
Irredentism (London, 1981). This volume is primarily
concerned with the emigre aspects of "pan-Turkism."

110. H. B. Paksoy, Alpamysh.

111. For the career of Mir-Said Sultan Galiev, see
Masayuki Yamauchi, "One Aspect of Democratization in
Tataristan: The Dream of Sultangaliev Revisited"
presented to the Conference on Islam and Democratization
in Central Asia, held at the University of Massachusetts
-Amherst, 26-27 September 1992; idem, The Dream of
Sultangaliev (Tokyo, 1986); A. Bennigsen & S. Enders
Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union:
A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World
(Chicago, 1979).

112. Cf. Bennigsen & Wimbush, Muslim National Communism
in the Soviet Union. P. 46, from Z. I. Gimranov, at the
Ninth Conference of the Tatar Obkom, 1923, and published
in Stenograficheskii otchot 9oi oblastnoi Konferensii
Tatarskoi organizatsii RKP (b) (Kazan, 1924), P. 130.
It is recalled that during 1922-1923, the British
Labor party was rapidly becoming a parlimentary force. In
January 1924, Ramsey Macdonald headed the first Labor
government, which was replaced by Conservatives led by
Stanley Baldwin in November the same year. Also, the
Irish rebellion of 1921 was still in the background, that
gave an added urgency to the nature and prospects of
political leadership in Britain.

113. Russian Communist Party (bolshevik).

114. Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan. See above. Before his move
to West, he was known as Zeki Validov.

115. Speech at the Fourth Conference of the Central
Committee of the RCP(b) with the responsible Workers of
the National Republics and Regions, 10 June 1923.
Published in "The Sultan Galiev Case." J. V. Stalin,
Works Vol. 5, 1921-1923. (Moscow, 1953). Cf. Bennigsen &
Wimbush, Moslem National Communism, Pp. 158-165.

116. Cf. Bennigsen & Wimbush, Muslim National Communism,
P. 91.

117. A more detailed version of the discussion in this
section was presented by H. B. Paksoy, to YALE
University-Hopkins Summer Seminars, 9 July 1990.

118. See AACAR Bulletin Vol. IV, No. 1 (Spring 1991).

119. Gregory Gleason, "Educating for Underdevelopment:
The Soviet Vocational Education System and its Central
Asian Critics" Central Asian Survey Vol. 4, No. 2 1985;
Patricia M. Carley, "Ecology in Central Asia: The Price
of the Plan. Perceptions of Cotton and Health in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan" Central Asian Survey Vol. 8,
No. 4, 1989.

120. A more comprehensive version of the discussion in
this section was presented by H. B. Paksoy, to the
Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo,
during June, 1991.

121. RL Daily Report, Munich, February 6, 1990.

122. The interview was printed in the Leningrad youth
newspaper Smena, and reprinted in Komsomolets
Uzbekistana, in a "slightly abridged form." See "Islamic
Explosion Possible in Central Asia" Munich, February 5,
1990, (RLR/P. Goble).

123. The January 1990 issue of Nauka i religiia. See
"Three Soviet Myths on Religion Exploded" Munich,
February 2, 1990 (RLR/P. Goble).

124. James Critchlow, "Corruption, Nationalism and the
Native Elites in Soviet Central Asia" The Journal of
Communist Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1988.

125. For reports, see Conflict in the Soviet Union: The
Untold Story of the Clashes in Kazakistan (New York:
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1990)
Cf. AACAR Bulletin Vol. IV, No. 1 (Spring, 1991);
Turkestan, Supplement to AACAR Bulletin Vol. III, No. 2
(Fall, 1990), repinted in H. B. Paksoy, Editor, Central
Asia Reader (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

126. In an interview published in the West Berlin daily
Tageszeitung of June 25, 1990. RL Daily Report, Munich,
June 26, 1990 (Victor Yasmann). Moskovskie novosti
published the biography of KGB General Oleg Kalugin, whose
recent revelations about the KGB have attracted so much
attention: Born in 1934, Kalugin joined the KGB in 1958.
The next year, he was sent --along with Aleksandr
Yakovlev-- as one of the first Soviet exchange students to
study for a year at Columbia University. He stayed in the
US for several years, working for the KGB first as a
journalist and then as first secretary of the USSR
Embassy in Washington under Anatolii Dobrynin. In 1972,
Kalugin became chief of the KGB's counterintelligence
service in Vladimir Kryuchkov's First Chief Directorate.
In 1980, KGB boss Yurii Andropov transferred him to the
post of first deputy chief of the KGB Administration in
Leningrad. See RL Daily Report, Munich, June 26, 1990
(Alexander Rahr).

127. Moreover, some of the Soviet "ethnic" and
"nationality" appellations were created by decree, partly
for that purpose. For example, Meskhetians are not
ethnically Turks, but were so designated during the
Second World War (on 15 November 1944) to suit the needs
of the Soviet regime. See S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald
Wixman, "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet
Central Asia" Canadian Slavonic Papers Vol. XVII, No. 1,
1975.

128. See the supplement to AACAR Bulletin Vol III, No. 2
(Fall, 1990).

129. "...When he [Lenin] wanted faithful guards, Lenin
took Latvian riflemen with him. He knew that if you want
to protect yourself against the Russians, you put
minorities in charge. If you are afraid of minorities,
you use Russians." See S. Enders Wimbush, The Ethnic
Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces (Rand Report, 1982)
R-2787/1. P. 19. Also, Susan L. Curran and Dmitry
Ponomareff, Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and
Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview (Rand Report,
1982) R- 2640/1.

130. RL Daily Report, Munich, February 6, 1990.

131. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and
Addresses, S. I. Rosenman, Ed. (New York, 1938-1950)
Vol. VI.

132. George J. Demko, The Russian Colonization of
Kazakhstan 1896-1916 (Bloomington, 1969). Indiana
University Uralic-Altaic Series Vol. 99. Soviets also
made land demands on other nationalities, and took land
by military force, including in the Baltic region.

133. See Z. V. Togan, Turkili Turkistan; idem, Hatiralar;
Stephen Blank, "The Struggle for Soviet Bashkiria
1917-1923" Nationalities Papers. No. 1, 1983; idem, "The
Contested Terrain: Muslim Political Participation in
Soviet Turkestan, 1917-1919" Central Asian Survey Vol. 6,
No. 4, 1987; R. Baumann, "Subject Nationalities in the
Military Service of Imperial Russia: The Case of
Bashkirs" Slavic Review (Fall/Winter 1987).

134. For the 1921 Kars Treaty, see Kazim Karabekir,
Istiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul, 1960).

135. Alexander Rahr, "Zhirinovsky's Plea for
Dictatorship," RFE/RL Daily Report No. 124, 2 July 1992.
The leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Vladimir
Zhirinovskii, told Rossiya (No. 27) that a majority of
Russians favor dictatorship. He said that he wants to
reinstall the Russian empire, first within the boundaries
of the former USSR, but subsequently along the borders of
the former Tsarist empire. He stated that right-wing
forces will come to power in Russia and Germany under the
slogan of the protection of the white race and divide
eastern Europe among themselves. He added that after the
forthcoming demise of the United States, Alaska will also
be incorporated into the Russian empire. He noted that,
if elected president, he would strenghten the army and
state security forces."

136. Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers. H. Hardy and A.
Kelly, Eds. (London, 1978); Edward L. Keenan, "Muscovite
Political Folkways" Russian Review, Vol. 45, 1986.

137. Chaadaev (1794-1856) wrote the "A Philosophical
Letter," "....that caused the suppression of the
newspaper which published it, dismissal of the censor who
passed it, its editor to be exiled, and Chaadaev was
declared madman... By order of Nicholas I [Chadaaev was]
put under police supervision. For a year he had to endure
daily visits by a physician and policeman." See Readings
in Russian Civilization Vol. II.

138. Also known as the "Black Hundreds," was founded in
1905 as a modern party in support of autocracy. "[This
party] ....showed special hostility to the
intelligentsia. Above all it was anti- Semitic and
nationalist. Its support came from those who organized
the pogroms of Jewish property in the southern and
south-western provinces. It was essentially the
forerunner of the fascist movements of the 1930s." Cf.
Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire.

139. Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, founder of
Bolshevik police to enforce the decisions of the Russian
Communist Party, later to become KGB. See John J. Dziak,
Chekisty: A History of the KGB (New York, 1988).

140. Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827-1907), professor of
civil law, Moscow University; member of government
committee drafting judicial reforms of 1864; member of
the ruling State Council. "Pobedonostsev is said to have
served as a model for Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor." See
Readings in Russian Civilization Vol. II, Imperial Russia
1700-1917. "The Falsehood of Democracy" appeared in K.
Pobedonostsev, Reflections of a Russian Statesman
(London, 1898).

141. Leonard Shapiro, "The Pre-Revolutionary
Intelligentsia and the Legal Order" Russian Studies. Ellen
Dahrendorf, Editor, (London/New York: Penguin, 1987).
Reprinted from Daedalus (Summer, 1960); Richard Wortmann,
The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness
(Princeton, 1978).

142. See H. B. Paksoy, "Nationality and Religion: Three
Observations from Omer Seyfettin" Central Asian Survey
Vol. 3, No. 3 (1984).